Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy by Logan, Wayne A.
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
Fall 2008
Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex
Offender Policy
Wayne A. Logan
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 51 (2008),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/180
51 
Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex 
Offender Policy  
 
 
Wayne A. Logan* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
“[A]ll crime,” Justice Potter Stewart once observed, “is a national problem.”1  
To the extent this assessment is accurate, it poses special difficulty for a federalist 
system such as ours, which reposes main police power authority in the states, not 
the national government, and has traditionally favored a decentralized approach to 
governance.  In recent decades, however, nationalism has largely trumped 
federalism concerns, as Congress and the President have federalized a broad range 
of criminal misconduct previously the exclusive province of states.  The effort, as 
students of the field are well aware, has inspired extensive critical commentary2 
and two recent Supreme Court decisions overturning federal laws.3  
The proliferation of federal criminal laws, however, is only part of the 
federalization story; indeed, in practical terms, only a small part.  Because the U.S. 
can prosecute and punish only a small fraction of the nation’s criminal offenders, 
recent federalization efforts have had largely symbolic importance.4  Moreover, 
while the unfairness to defendants disadvantaged when their cases “go federal” is 
                                                                                                                            
*   Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Florida 
State University College of Law.  Thanks to Rachel Barkow, Susan Frederick, Brian Galle, Dan 
Markel, Mark Seidenfeld, Bill Van Alstyne, and Ron Wright for comments and suggestions; to 
Christopher Ewbank, J.D. 2009, for research help; and to Mary McCormick, for library support.  
Also, with regard to the article’s title, a hat tip is in order to predecessor efforts in similar subject 
areas, see, for example, Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and 
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995); Peter Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration 
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997).   
1   Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
2   For a representative sampling see, for example, Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, 
Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789 (1996); John S. Baker, Jr., State 
Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673 (1999); Kathleen 
Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 
(1995). 
3   See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (invalidating a federal law 
allowing civil damages for victims of gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 551 (1995) (invalidating a federal law criminalizing the possession or use of a firearm in or near 
a school). 
4   See Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1555-56 n.71 
(2002); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 844 
(2006). 
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not to be minimized,5 such impact is limited to individual cases actually channeled 
into the federal system.  
This Article focuses on a species of federalization of a much broader kind: the 
nationwide imposition by the federal government of a criminal justice policy 
relating to sex offender registration and community notification.  State registration 
and notification laws, now in effect nationwide and affecting the daily lives of over 
600,000 individuals, and having major resource-related impact on the states, are 
the direct result of federal initiative and preference.  The federal government has 
achieved its goal not by imposing its will straightforwardly on states via the 
Commerce Clause, which has provoked such consternation in federalization 
debates, but rather more subtly through its conditional Spending Power authority.  
The strategic use of honey, not vinegar, has proved a marked success and been met 
with silence from the courts, serving to “fasten on the States federal notions of 
criminal justice” in a massive way.6  
The story of how the federal government achieved this success, and the 
consequences it has had, will be examined in the following pages.7  The Article 
first provides an overview of the increasing federal involvement in criminal justice 
matters over time, then surveys federal efforts since 1994 to enact registration and 
community notification laws in particular, culminating with enactment of the 
Adam Walsh Act in 2006.  Passed by voice votes in both the House and Senate, 
and quickly signed by the president, the Walsh Act marks a zenith in federal 
intrusiveness, containing an unprecedented array of exacting registration and 
notification requirements for states to adopt.  The law seeks to create a uniform 
national regime and was motivated by congressional concern over the perceived 
“patchwork” of “weak” state laws containing “loopholes” permitting individuals to 
evade registration and notification.  These suppositions, however, do not withstand 
empirical scrutiny, and, even more fundamentally, are themselves predicated on an 
as yet empirically unsubstantiated faith in the efficacy and effects of registration 
and notification.  Despite this uncertainty, the U.S. has forged ahead, unreservedly 
imposing a comprehensive national regime.  
The Walsh Act and predecessor federal laws dating back to 1994 have had a 
major impact on states (and their residents) and serious implications for 
constitutional federalism.  Part III examines the significant federalism 
consequences of the extended federal campaign to impose upon states national 
registration and notification policy, and how and why the effort has failed to 
                                                                                                                            
5   See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 643 (1997). 
6   Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
7   For a fuller treatment of registration and community notification laws, which originated in 
municipal provisions enacted in the early 1930s to monitor emigrant “gangsters,” see WAYNE A. 
LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN 
AMERICA (Stanford Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2009).   
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prompt resistance.  Doctrinal concerns over federalism, persuasive as they may be, 
however, fail to resolve the instrumental question of the relative utility of the 
federal government in the policy formation process.  As a result, Part IV considers 
the suitability of Congress as a central planner of criminal justice policy, and 
presuming the continued determination of the U.S. to play a central role, the nature 
and form it should take.  
 
II. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT  
 
A. Overview  
 
By constitutional design and tradition, the mission of the federal government 
in regulating the well-being and safety of its citizenry is highly circumscribed.  The 
U.S. is bestowed with the “few and defined” areas of authority prescribed in the 
Constitution8 and the Tenth Amendment “reserve[s]” the balance of such authority 
to states.9  Included in this state reservoir is the police power, an expansive 
authority James Madison regarded as extending “to all objects which, in the 
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the    
people . . . .”10    
For much of the nation’s history, this demarcation prevailed, with the federal 
government exercising restraint relative to its police power authority and the states 
defending their prerogative.  This changed, however, in the decades following the 
Civil War with what Lawrence Friedman has termed the “culture of mobility,” 
fostered by the increasing availability of automobiles and railroads, which made 
state boundaries “increasingly porous” and conducive to inter-state criminal 
misconduct.11  Believing the states ill-equipped to address this shift, Congress 
                                                                                                                            
8   McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); see also Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (noting “that immense mass of legislation” that states had “not 
surrendered to the general government”).  The Constitution grants the federal government explicit 
authority only relative to counterfeiting, piracy, military crimes, crimes against the law of nations, 
and treason.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8. 
9   See U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal system, 
the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.’”); Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone.  
Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as 
Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United 
States.”). 
10  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 260–61 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885) (recognizing that “there is a 
power, sometimes called the police power,…upon the proper exercise of which . . . may depend the 
public health, the public morals, or the public safety. . . ”).    
11  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 209, 263 (1993).  
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expanded the reach of federal criminal law jurisdiction beyond that specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution.  Although initially focusing on the need to control 
monopolies, lotteries, and the interstate transport of diseased animals, federal 
jurisdiction soon expanded to the interstate transport of females for immoral 
purposes (Mann Act, 1910), narcotics (Harrison Act, 1914), kidnapping 
(Lindbergh Kidnapping Act, 1932), transporting stolen vehicles across state lines 
(Dyer Act, 1919), and racketeering (Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 1934).12  Most 
significant, in 1919, as a result of adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and the 
Volstead Act,13 the federal government outlawed the manufacture, sale or transport 
of alcohol.  
By and large, however, for much of the first half of the twentieth century 
criminal justice remained a state and local concern, and the federal impact on 
criminal justice matters remained limited and episodic.14  Indeed, while President 
Herbert Hoover is generally credited with first characterizing crime as a national 
political issue in his 1929 inaugural address,15 Hoover himself—consistent with 
tradition—conceived of the federal crime control role as being highly 
circumscribed.  While urging a “war” on “gangsters,” for instance, Hoover insisted 
that the federal government lacked authority to intervene and that the states 
themselves step up enforcement of their own laws.16  
                                                                                                                            
12  Technically, the Mail Fraud Statute, enacted in 1872, constituted the first U.S. incursion on 
states’ criminal jurisdiction, yet it was predicated on the enumerated power of Congress to establish 
post offices.  See Brickey, supra note 2, at 1142. 
13  See generally RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE 
REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880–1920, at chs. 6–7 (1995) (chronicling the 
constitutional debate over Prohibition).   
14  This was not to say that federal intrusion was without impact on the federal criminal justice 
system.  In 1932, for instance, the number of federal criminal cases peaked as a result of Prohibition-
era alcohol cases, increasing by more than two and one-half times the volume of federal cases before 
Prohibition.  See Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 497 tbl.1 (1934).  
15  FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 273.  Hoover followed up by proposing establishment of a 
federal commission to study the national implications of crime, which in 1931 resulted in the 
publication of a fourteen-volume report under the auspices of the Wickersham Commission.  Id. at 
273–74.  For more on the seminal role of Hoover in nationalizing concern over crime see JAMES D. 
CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: HERBERT HOOVER’S 
INITIATIVES (1993). 
16  President Demands War on Gangsters; Puts Duty on States: Calls for ’Awakening to 
Failure of Some Local Governments to Protect Their Citizens,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1930, at 1.  The 
same sentiment of federal restraint was voiced by his Attorney General, William DeWitt Mitchell, 
who emphasized that  
[d]ealing with organized crime . . . is largely a local problem . . . . [T]he fact that these 
criminal gangs incidentally violate some federal statute does not place the primary duty 
and responsibility of punishing them upon the Federal Government, and until state police 
and magistrates, stimulated by public opinion, take hold of this problem, it will not be 
solved. 
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Even the hugely popular Lindbergh Kidnapping Act, enacted in the wake of 
the abduction and murder of aviator Charles Lindbergh’s child, a crime one 
newspaper called “a challenge to the whole order of the nation,”17 was resisted out 
of concern that the federal government was intruding on state prerogative.  As 
Representative Earl Michener (R-MI) remarked on the House floor, the tragedy 
“must not become a precedent for more legislation giving the Federal Government 
concurrent authority with the States in enforcing police regulations and laws 
dealing with matters in which the States are primarily interested, and which can be 
properly dealt with by State action.”18  Similarly, J. Edgar Hoover, who assumed 
leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1924, repeatedly rebuffed 
congressional efforts to expand federal criminal law authority, echoing the long-
held aversion for a “national police force.”19  
In the wake of the 1964 presidential campaign, in which Republican 
challenger Barry Goldwater’s focus on “violence in the streets” propelled criminal 
justice to national attention, federal reluctance to law-make on criminal justice 
matters receded.20  During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, amid 
unprecedented high rates of violent crime,21 Congress enacted a series of omnibus 
bills that vastly expanded the scope of federal criminal law, targeting firearms and 
narcotics in particular.22  
                                                                                                                            
HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE 
AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 478 (1937). 
17  RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 175 (1987); 
see also Horace L. Bomar, Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 436 (1934) 
(“Public sentiment having been aroused by this atrocious deed, there was an instant demand that 
Congress ‘do something’ about it.”). 
18  See 75 CONG. REC. H13,283 (June 17, 1932) (statement of Rep. Michener).  Hoover also 
opposed using the case as a basis for extending federal criminal justice authority.  CALDER, supra 
note 15, at 201. 
19  SANFORD J. UNGAR, FBI 79 (1976); see also Phillip B. Heyman & Mark H. Moore, The 
Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLS. & SOC. SCI. 103, 108 (1996) (noting historic anxiety of national police 
force); TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1998) (“Historically, centralization of criminal law 
enforcement power in the federal government has been perceived as creating potentially dangerous 
consequences and has therefore been avoided.”).   
20  On this national political shift more generally see TED GEST, CRIME AND POLITICS: BIG 
GOVERNMENT’S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW & ORDER (2001); NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF 
FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960–1993 (1994). 
21  See Corrina B. Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?  Rethinking the Warren Court’s 
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1417–18 (2004).  
22  See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236 (1970); Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984); Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).   
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In addition to legislation, the federal government came to see a significantly 
increased role for itself in the administration of criminal justice.23  The President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Administration, which in 
1967 released its landmark study, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 
figured centrally in this evolution.  The Commission offered several justifications 
for an enhanced federal role.  First, the trans-boundary nature of crime and the 
negative externalities thought associated with the uneven enforcement capacity of 
states necessitated federal involvement: 
 
[C]rime is a national, as well as a State and local, phenomenon; it often 
does not respect geographical boundaries.  The FBI has demonstrated the 
high mobility of many criminals.  Failure of the criminal justice 
institutions in one State may endanger the citizens of others….As 
President Johnson stated in his 1966 Crime Message to Congress: 
“Crime does not observe neat, jurisdictional lines between city, State, 
and Federal Governments . . . .  To improve in one part of the country we 
must improve in all parts.”24  
 
Moreover, individual states, the Commission noted, lacked the wherewithal to 
pursue the “sweeping and costly changes” necessary to secure a significant 
nationwide reduction in crime.25  The superior resources of the federal government 
were needed to foster the research and experimental efforts prerequisite to this 
undertaking.    
The programmatic initiative the Commission urged, by its own admission “a 
large one,”26 was to be undertaken with due sensitivity for the states’ preeminent 
role relative to criminal justice.  Rather than dictating policy, federal involvement 
would entail “support and collaboration”27 intended to “lead and coordinate change 
                                                                                                                            
23  In his first message to Congress, President Johnson asserted that the “Federal Government 
will henceforth take a more meaningful role in meeting the whole spectrum of problems posed by 
crime,” and offered that crime control “is an area in which the solution depends on cooperation from 
the officials of all the fifty states, and also the President, Attorney General, and the FBI.”  Johnson, as 
Nancy Marion notes, described “a new and previously untested cooperative role in crime control 
between the state and federal governments.”  MARION, supra note 20, at 60.     
24  PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 284 (1967). 
25  Id. 
26  Id.; see also id. at 283 (“[T]he Federal Government can make a dramatic new contribution 
to the national effort against crime by greatly expanding its support of the agencies of justice in the 
States and in the cities.”).  
27  See id. at 285 (“In proposing a major Federal program against crime, the Commission is 
mindful of the special importance of avoiding any invasion of State and local responsibility for law 
enforcement and criminal justice, and its recommendation is based on its judgment that Federal 
support and collaboration of the sort outlined below are consistent with scrupulous respect for—and 
indeed strengthening of—that responsibility.”). 
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through providing financial and technical assistance and support of research.”28  
Under the auspices of the Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration 
(LEAA), created as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968,29 over time the federal government provided state and local governments $8 
billion in funds.30  Consistent with ascendant enthusiasm for New Federalism, 
which emphasized the essential role of states in combating the nation’s social ills,31 
and ongoing congressional concern over federal displacement of state crime 
control authority more generally,32 money was disbursed in the form of direct 
block grants,33 with the states identifying funding priorities and devising initiatives 
to handle them.34  The LEAA, as summarized by Malcolm Feeley and Austin Sarat 
in their book on the era, had three main functions: (1) oversee the distribution and 
expenditure of funds to states; (2) sponsor research and demonstration projects; 
and (3) provide technical assistance to the states.35  Put more bluntly, in the words 
of Senator Roman Hruska (R-NE), a chief proponent of the bill creating the 
agency, the LEAA was a “check writing machine.”36  
                                                                                                                            
28  Id. at 301 (“Control of crime and improvement of criminal justice are basically State and 
local concerns . . . . The role of the Federal Government must be to lead and coordinate change 
through providing financial and technical assistance and support of research.”). 
29  See generally Robert F. Diegelman, Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control: 
Lessons of the LEAA Experience, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 994 (1982). 
30  DOUGLAS MCDONALD & PETER FINN, ABT ASSOCS. INC., CRIME AND JUSTICE TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES DURING THE PAST THREE DECADES 19 (2000).  
31  MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY 
AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 42–43 (1980) (“It is the states, the New 
Federalism suggests, which are both close enough to the citizens to understand their problems yet 
large enough to be able to effectively deal with them.  In contrast, Washington is too remote and local 
governments too small.”). 
32  See Diegelman, supra note 29, at 997 (noting with respect to the origins of the LEAA; “any 
suggested federal role had to avoid even the slightest appearance that local authority for crime control 
was being usurped by the federal government.”); Howard E. Peskoe, The 1968 Safe Streets Act: 
Congressional Response to the Growing Crime Problem, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 69, 88–90, 
110 (1973) (quoting extensive House and Senate debates expressing concern over federal incursion).   
33  Initially, the Johnson Administration proposed grants-in-aid, to be administered by the U.S. 
Attorney General, who would wield significant discretionary power over the programs to be funded.  
FEELEY & SARAT, supra note 31, at 41–42.  Republican resistance soon arose over the method, in part 
due to law enforcement officials expressing alarm over the prospect of Johnson’s Attorney General (a 
liberal, Ramsey Clark) dictating local policies. Id. The end result of substituting block grants for 
grants-in-aid was one of making states the dominant player in a partnership role with the federal 
government.  Id. at 48–49; see also Peskoe, supra note 32, at 88–89.      
34  See Diegelman, supra note 29, at 998 (“[t]he states were to select both the recipients and 
the uses of these grants.  The states, not the Congress or the federal government, would make choices, 
set priorities, and allocate funds.”).  
35  FEELEY & SARAT, supra note 31, at 49. 
36  Id. at 48. 
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After sustained criticism over its inefficiency, mismanagement, and failure to 
achieve tangible crime-reduction results, the LEAA was phased out upon 
recommendation of President Carter in 1980.37  The Reagan Administration, while 
publicly endorsing state criminal justice supremacy, considered federal assistance 
in the form of grants and contracts an inappropriate use of federal funds.38  As a 
result, federal involvement in the 1980s assumed a more passive form, with a 
cluster of agencies such as the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (all created in 1979) providing 
federal technical support and expertise.39  Yet, the political salience of crime 
control was no more lost on President Reagan than any of his recent White House 
predecessors.  To Reagan, as Daniel Richman has noted, the demise of the LEAA 
and its largesse “had more to do with fiscal policy than federalism concerns.”40   
Indeed, the Reagan Administration’s tepid federalism was evidenced in its 
combined efforts with Congress in the 1980s to dramatically expand federal laws 
relating to narcotics and firearms.41  Meanwhile, Congress, acutely aware of 
several high-profile crimes in states, expanded federal criminal jurisdiction in other 
areas.  Among the most notable instances was the 1992 enactment of a federal anti-
carjacking statute, passed after a widely reported case of a Maryland woman who 
was dragged to death while attempting to rescue her daughter from her stolen car.42  
Even though state authorities successfully prosecuted the perpetrators under 
Maryland statutory law, and life sentences were imposed, Congress fixated on the 
lack of U.S. jurisdiction, and quickly passed a new provision;43 two years later, the 
law was amended to make fatal carjackings death penalty-eligible.44  
Despite these developments, during the 1980s and early 1990s Congress 
continued to fund state anti-crime programs by means of grants.  For instance, the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, enacted shortly after the demise of the 
LEAA, re-opened the federal money spigot to states (albeit at a rate short of that 
allocated before).45  Far more significant were two bills passed in 1990 and 1994.  
The Crime Control Act of 1990 authorized $900 million in grants for use in state 
                                                                                                                            
37  Diegelman, supra note 29, at 996. 
38  John J. DiIulio, Jr. et al., The Federal Role in Crime Control, in CRIME 445, 455 (James Q. 
Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995). 
39  Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & 
JUST. 377, 392 (2006).  
40  Id. at 393. 
41  Id. at 395–97. 
42  GEST, supra note 20, at 69. 
43  Id.  
44  See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 
60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (amending 18 U.S.C. §  2119(3)(1988)). 
45  KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
POLITICS 94–95 (1997). 
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and local anti-crime efforts, disbursed under a program named after a New York 
City police officer killed in the line of duty in 1988: the Edward Byrne Memorial 
State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs.46  The Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized allocation of $30 billion to 
state and local governments to fight crime.47  
As the preceding overview suggests, the federal government has over time 
increasingly involved itself in the nation’s crime control efforts, with Congress 
making liberal use of its Commerce Clause authority to expand its criminal law 
jurisdiction and invoking its spending power to figure more centrally in state 
criminal justice systems.  However, these latter efforts were largely without impact 
on substantive law and policy, with the federal government being content to 
support the states with grants for equipment, planning, and research support.  
In 1994, however, Congress also put its spending authority to more coercive 
use to compel changes in state criminal justice policy.  It did so with respect to the 
community control of convicted sex offenders, a matter unmistakably within the 
historic purview of states, by coercing state compliance by means of conditional 
funding demands.  And whereas in the past, even as recently as the 1980s in its 
effort to combat drugs, the federal government at least paid lip service to 
federalism concerns,48 in the mid-1990s, with sex offenders, such concern 
dissipated, giving way to the creation of an unprecedented national criminal justice 
policy.49  
                                                                                                                            
46  Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6091(a), 102 Stat. 
4312, 4329. 
47  JEFFEREY A. ROTH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 183643, 
NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE COPS PROGRAM-TITLE 1 OF THE 1994 CRIME ACT 41 (2000), available 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183643.pdf. 
48  See, e.g., DRUG ABUSE POLICY OFFICE, WHITE HOUSE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTION 
OF DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 1982, at 3 (1982) (“The 1982 Strategy does not attempt to 
dictate from a national level the relative priorities for local responses to drug problems.”).  By 1990, 
however, one sees a shift in tone, with the White House expecting state adherence to federal policy.  
See William J. Bennett, Introduction to OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY WHITE PAPER, 
STATE DRUG CONTROL STATUS REPORT 1, 3 (1990) (“Each State can and should be expected to adopt 
the laws and policies addressed in this report . . . .”).  Federal efforts, however, unlike with sex 
offender registration policy, never got beyond the hortatory during this time.  
49  On the greater coerciveness of federal policy more generally, see John Kincaid, From 
Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139 (1990); Paul 
Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS 390, 390–92,400 (2007).  
Tim Conlan offers that the relationship has become more “opportunistic” than “coercive,” with 
federal actors pursuing “their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective 
consequences.”  Tim Conlan, From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the 
Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on  Intergovernmental Relations, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
663, 667 (2006); see also Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W. 
Bush Administration, 37 PUBLIUS 432, 446–47 (2007) (asserting that federal-state relations are more 
nuanced than descriptions such as “coercive” or “cooperative” convey).  Such a view comports with 
that of Daryl Levinson, who asserts that federal actors are motivated more by the immediate desire to 
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B. Federal Registration and Community Notification Legislation  
 
It has become commonplace to conceive of the nation’s modern response to 
sex offenders as stemming from a “moral panic.”  The phrase, if not the concept, 
originated with sociologist Stanley Cohen in his 1972 study of the exaggerated 
response in England to “Mods and Rockers,” teenage groups who in the mid-1960s 
engaged in a series of disturbances in a seaside town. “Societies,” Cohen observed, 
“appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic,” resulting in 
the “moral barricades [being] manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other 
right-thinking people,” and drastic solutions proffered.50  The same phenomenon 
was observed by criminologist Edwin Sutherland in 1950, in a study of state laws 
originating in the late 1930s that targeted “sexual psychopaths” for indefinite 
involuntary civil commitment.51  More recently, adopting a broader historical 
framework, Philip Jenkins has identified the nation’s recurrent tendency to fixate 
on sexual abuse (especially of children), dating back a century.52  
The most recent wave of concern originated in the early 1980s, prompted by 
the 1981 disappearance of six-year-old Adam Walsh in Hollywood, Florida, which 
led to a massive two-week search that captivated the nation’s attention.  After the 
boy’s remains were discovered in a canal, his parents, John and Reve Walsh, 
initiated a national crusade to “mak[e] the country safe for these little people.”53  
Over the next several years, Congress dedicated significant attention to the plight 
of missing and kidnapped children, allocating millions of dollars to fund the 
campaign, including creation of the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children, to be headed by John Walsh.  By the late 1980s, however, earlier 
estimates of the 1.5 million missing children were called into question, with 
studies indicating that the vast majority of children were not “literally missing,” 
but rather were in the company of family members and abductions and killings by 
strangers were uncommon.54 
                                                                                                                            
remain in office than any per se desire for empire-building.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005). 
50  STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
51  Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. SOC. 142, 146–
47 (1950).  
52  PHILLIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN 
AMERICA (1998).  Moral panic, while useful as an analytic framework suggestive of the tenor of the 
times, implies that the underlying concern—such as that posed by the Mods and Rockers in Cohen’s 
seminal work—is somehow not worthy of concern.  Sexual abuse, no matter what its actual extent, is 
surely worthy of concern.  
53  Sandy Rovner, Hot Line of Hope; After ‘Adam,’ Three Children are Found, WASH. POST, 
May 1, 1985, at C1.   
54  See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND 
THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA, FIRST REPORT: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS NATIONAL 
INCIDENCE STUDIES vii (1990).    
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As a result, focus and concern soon shifted from child abduction and abuse to 
sexual victimization.  Even though it was never confirmed that Adam Walsh was 
sexually abused, his image persisted as a reminder of the possible depredations 
faced by children, and soon coalesced with media reports of widespread sexual 
abuse in day care centers, including centers in California, North Carolina, and 
Minnesota.  Meanwhile, other child victimizations captured the nation’s attention 
and fueled concern.  In May 1989, a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington, 
(whose identity was not revealed) was sexually abused and mutilated by Earl 
Shriner, a recidivist sex offender with a long history of convictions.  And in 
October 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was abducted from near his home 
in rural Minnesota by a masked male adult brandishing a gun.55  Although no 
arrests were ever made, and his remains never found, the tragedy prompted his 
mother Patty to create the Jacob Wetterling Foundation, an organization that would 
come to have significant national influence on child violence and sexual abuse 
policy matters.56  
The events in Washington State and Minnesota had major effect, not only 
because they garnered significant media attention, but also because they spurred 
renewed interest in a long-overlooked social control strategy: requiring that 
criminal offenders register with authorities.  While the idea of registering ex-
offenders originated in Europe and elsewhere, registration first took hold in the 
United States in the early 1930s, in the Los Angeles area, amid widespread 
concern over emigrant “gangsters.”  Florida, in 1937, became the first state to 
adopt a registration law, but did so sparingly, only requiring registration of persons 
convicted of felonies “involving moral turpitude” living in the state’s three most 
populous counties.  In 1947, California enacted the nation’s first registration law of 
state-wide application, targeting convicted sex offenders.  By 1989, however, only 
a handful of states had laws.57 
In response to the assault by Shriner, as well as a series of other widely 
reported sexual victimizations of women and children, Washington State enacted 
its Community Protection Act of 1990.  The expansive law, which not only 
contained the state’s first registration provision and permitted the involuntary civil 
commitment of sex offenders, for the first time permitted public disclosure of 
identifying information on registrants themselves (a process that came to be known 
as “community notification”).  Minnesota, in response to the Wetterling tragedy, 
enacted a registration law (sans community notification) in 1991, becoming the 
fifteenth state to require registration.58  
                                                                                                                            
55  Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification 
Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2003).  
56  For a history of the organization and its advocacy efforts see Jacob Wetterling Foundation, 
http://www.jwf.org (last visited September 5, 2008). 
57  See LOGAN, supra note 7, at ch. 2. 
58  Logan, supra note 55, at 1293. 
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The aforementioned state developments did not escape the attention of 
Congress.  Indeed, Wetterling’s October 1989 disappearance in Minnesota 
prompted the state’s senior U.S. Senator, David Durenberger (R-MN), in May 
1991, to push for adoption of the “Crimes Against Children Registration Act.”59  
Durenberger told his Senate colleagues: 
 
The reasons for enacting this legislation on the national level are clear: 
sexual crimes against children are widespread; the people who commit 
these offenses repeat their crimes again and again; and local law 
enforcement officials need access to an interstate system of information 
to prevent and respond to these horrible crimes against children.60 
 
Despite the uncertainty attending Jacob’s disappearance, Durenberger stressed 
that if law enforcement “had been aware of the presence of any convicted sex 
offenders in the community, it would have been of invaluable assistance during 
those first critical hours of investigation.”61  Durenberger urged congressional 
adoption of a registration system like that enacted in Minnesota, which required 
persons convicted of a sexual offense against a child to register a home address 
with local law enforcement for a period of ten years after release into the 
community.62  Representative Jim Ramstad (R-MN) introduced a similar bill in the 
House in July.63  However, despite the backing of the Wetterling Foundation and 
bi-partisan support in both houses of Congress, registration failed to pass muster in 
the Senate after conference.64  
Undaunted, Durenberger continued his push for legislation, which soon was 
renamed in memory of Jacob Wetterling.65  In November 1993, the campaign was 
advanced in the House by Ramstad, who, along with numerous others, emphasized 
the need for a registration law in light of the purported high recidivism risk of sex 
                                                                                                                            
59  Associated Press, Jacob’s Parents Urge Support for Abuser Bill, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Minneapolis), May 26, 1991, at B7 (noting and discussing Senate Bill 1170).  A year earlier, Senator 
Durenberger, with Patty Wetterling and her son Trevor in the public gallery, spoke to his colleagues 
of Jacob’s abduction and called for “more study and resources into reducing” child abductions.  He 
also entered into the record a Department of Justice report and newspaper stories on the issue, as well 
as information on the Wetterling Foundation. 136 CONG. REC. S5761 (daily ed. May 7, 1990).  
60  137 CONG. REC. S6702, S6703 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
61  Id.  
62  See id. at S6703.      
63  137 CONG. REC. H5339, H5340 (daily ed. July 10, 1991) (introducing H.R. 2862). 
64  See 140 CONG. REC. S2825, S2825 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
Durenberger discussing three years of unsuccessful efforts to enact registration legislation); 139 
CONG. REC. S6863, S6863 (statement of Sen. Durenberger discussing failure of the 102nd Congress 
to pass registration as part of both Democratic and Republican crime bills). 
65  See 137 CONG. REC. S9809, S9822 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Durenberger). 
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offenders.66  Again, registration was touted for its capacity to provide law 
enforcement with access to information on convicted offenders in the immediate 
wake of a child being abducted or harmed.67  According to Representative James 
Sensenbrenner (R-WI):  
 
[b]ecause there is not a national registry of people who have been convicted 
of a crime against a child and have served their prison time and have been 
paroled out, law enforcement really is not able to track down those who 
would be the prime suspect as quickly as possible.  So that is why the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children Registration Act is before us today.68   
 
Even though twenty-four states at the time had registration laws, a federal 
“stick”69 was needed “to prod all States to enact similar laws and to provide for a 
national registration system to handle offenders who move from one State to 
another.”70  Federal law would do so by threatening to withhold crime-fighting 
funds from states that failed to adopt registration requirements prescribed by 
Congress.71  
In its original incarnations, starting in 1991, what was to become the Jacob 
Wetterling Act treated registrants’ information as “private data,” available only to 
law enforcement for investigative purposes and government agencies for 
confidential background checks on persons working with children.72  Indeed, while 
the bill was being considered, efforts to permit community notification were 
rebuffed.  A provision authorizing notification and also targeting “sexually violent 
predators,” who victimized adults, was inserted late in the process by Senator 
                                                                                                                            
66  See 139 CONG. REC. H10,319 H10,321 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Ramstad) (“We know that child sex offenders are repeat offenders. . . .  Child sex offenders repeat 
their crimes again and again and again to the point of compulsion.”); see also, e.g., id.. at H10,320 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“The reason this bill is so important is because of the high rate of 
recidivism in persons who have committed crimes against children, and it is not just sex crimes 
against children but all crimes against children.”); id. at H10,322 (statement of Rep. Grams) (“Studies 
have shown that child sex offenders are some of the most notorious repeat offenders. . . .  [T]his bill 
gives society the right to know where these convicted offenders reside.”).   
67  See id. at H10,320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); id. at H10,321 (statement of Rep. 
Ramstad).   
68  Id. at H10,320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
69  Id. (“The stick that is contained in this bill to make sure that those States that have not 
established this type of a list is the fact that if 3 years go by and a State does not have such a registry, 
their Bureau of Justice assistance grants funds are reduced by 10 percent and allocated to those States 
that have done this job.”).  
70  Id. at H10,321 (statement of Rep. Ramstad).  
71  42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2) (2006); see also 139 CONG. REC. H10,319, H10,320 (daily ed. 
Nov. 20, 1993).   
72  139 CONG. REC. H10,319, H10,320 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993); 137 CONG. REC. S6702, 
S6704 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).  
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Slade Gorton (R-WA) and Representative Jennifer Dunn (R-WA), based on 
provisions in Washington State’s 1990 law.73  Because House and Senate bills 
differed,74 with the House version omitting community notification,75 a conference 
committee was convened.  Speaking on behalf of notification in summer 1994, 
Dunn urged on the House floor: 
 
What is the point of registering and tracking these convicted predators if 
we are not going to share that information with the very citizens who are 
at risk?  How can we justify knowing where a sexual predator has 
located, and not notify the women and families in that neighborhood?  
The rate of recidivism for these crimes is astronomical.  We know that.  
And that is why it is incumbent upon us to ensure that community 
notification is encouraged.  Without the community notification, the 
effort is reduced simply to the collection of data.76 
 
Dunn’s non-binding motion urging the conference committee to include a 
notification provision prevailed by a 420-13 vote, yet the committee’s report, 
likely as a result of concern over its negative effects,77 omitted notification.78  
As history would have it, however, the report was released on the same day in 
late July 1994 as the media was dominated by reports of the rape and murder of 
seven-year-old Megan Kanka in suburban Hamilton Township, New Jersey, by a 
recidivist sex offender who lived nearby.79  By then, members of Congress—and 
the American public—had been privy to an extended series of grisly child sexual 
victimizations and killings by recidivist offenders, including those of Zachary 
Snider (Indiana, July 1993) and Polly Klaas (California, October 1993).  With 
news of the Megan Kanka tragedy, Senator Gorton and Representative Dunn took 
to the floor to castigate the conferees for omitting the community notification 
provision.  Gorton stated:  
 
[T]he conferees just do not get it. [Only providing information to police] 
is meaningless.  It would not have helped Megan Kanka . . . .  It would 
not have helped Polly Klaas. . . . 
 
                                                                                                                            
73  Robert T. Nelson, Gorton, Dunn Oppose Crime Bill, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A1. 
74  H.R. 324, 103d Cong. (1993), 139 CONG. REC. H10,319 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).  
75  See Nelson, supra note 73. 
76  140 CONG. REC. H5612, H5612 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Dunn).  
77  See id. at (statement of Rep. Nadler raising concern over possible vigilantism and 
banishment of registrants).  
78  Nelson, supra note 73. 
79  Id. 
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The families in these communities and these innocent victims had a right 
to know that dangerous sexual predators were in their midst.  My 
amendment to the crime bill would have provided exactly that kind of 
notification. . . . 
    
I offer this bipartisan bill today in the memory of Megan Kanka, Polly 
Klaas, and the thousands of innocent victims of brutal rapists, molesters, 
and murderers, that deserve to know when sexually violent predators 
were released into their community.80 
 
A week later, Dunn rose to speak in the House “with a deep sense of outrage”: 
 
Seven-year-old Megan Kanka of New Jersey is dead, Mr. Speaker.  
Sexual predators were released into her community and they lured that 
precious little girl to a grisly death. 
 
Conferees who worked to protect the rights of sexual predators should 
understand this: The next little girl killed by a released predator will 
haunt them. 
 
Mr. Speaker, it is outrageous that a few conferees have supplanted their 
will for the will of the House.  It is outrageous that this bill effectively 
denies notification to the next Megan Kanka or the next Polly Klaas, or 
to your mother or sister or daughter.  And it is outrageous that we would 
place the rights of criminals over the rights of victims.81  
  
Representative Dick Zimmer (R-NJ) made the absence of notification a key 
rallying point and Chris Smith (R-NJ), representing the township in which Megan 
Kanka lived, condemned the “arrogance” of the conferees and demanded that 
notification be included.  Smith stated, “No one in the community knew the killer’s 
sordid past, Mr. Speaker.  Had Megan’s grieving parents known that their neighbor 
was a dangerous person, they would have taken steps to protect their precious 
child.  Megan’s parents had a right to know.”82 
The redoubled effort to include a notification provision proved a success, in 
part as a result of lobbying efforts by President Bill Clinton,83 who signed the 
                                                                                                                            
80  140 CONG. REC. S10,638 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton).  
81  140 CONG. REC. H7939-40 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Rep. Dunn). 
82  Id. at H7950 (Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Rep. Smith).  See also Fred Bayles, Murder 
Renews Calls for Sex Crime Registry, CHI.-SUN TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at 3. 
83  See 140 CONG. REC. S11,889 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg, 
recounting that the President had called him twice urging that a notification provision be included); 
Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
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legislation into law (with Maureen Kanka at his side)84 as part of the massive $30 
billion omnibus anti-crime bill on September 13, 1994.85  
Intended to compel the states to enact registration laws and ensure adoption of 
registration minima,86 the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act required states to adopt its provisions if they 
wished to avoid losing ten percent of available Byrne Formula Grant criminal 
justice funds.87  States had to do so within three years of the law’s enactment, 
subject to a two-year extension for states making “good faith efforts,” and any 
undistributed funds resulting from a state’s failure to comply were to be reallocated 
to compliant states.88  
In its final form, the Wetterling Act also affected a broader swath of offenders 
than originally envisioned.  In initial form, in May 1991, the law targeted only 
persons “convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor.”89  When 
                                                                                                                            
1994, at B1 (noting that “[w]hen President Clinton lobbied for the Federal crime bill last summer, he 
mentioned Megan and the need for a community-notification provision. That provision is now part of 
Federal law.”).  See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Search for Votes  on Crime Turns Up Only 
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at B6 (noting report from Rep. Susan Molinari that 
President Clinton had expressed his regret that community notification had been dropped from the 
bill and that he would seek to get it reinserted).  
Clinton, as part of his “new Democrat” orientation, and anxious over Republican assertions that 
his policy of permitting gays to remain in the military amounted to condoning sexual perversion, as 
well as public statements that the Department of Justice had softened child pornography laws, quickly 
backed the legislation.  Soon thereafter, in the wake of major electoral gains by Republicans in the 
1994 elections, Clinton, seeking to not be outflanked by a Republican “family values” mantra, 
became a staunch supporter of legislation designed to target sex offenders and protect children.  
JENKINS, supra note 52, at 198–99. 
84  David Bauman, Crime Victim’s Mom: Signing of Crime Bill “Bittersweet,” GANNETT 
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 13, 1994. 
85  Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2038 [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)].  The expansive law contained  thirty-two 
separate titles, ranging from community policing, violence against women, the death penalty, 
mandatory minimum sentences for federal criminal offenders, and “truth-in-sentencing” provisions 
that provided “incentive grants” to states to ensure that state violent offenders serve at least 85% of 
their terms.  The varied contents very likely accounted for the relatively close vote margins, 235-195 
in the House, and 61-38 in the Senate.  As discussed below, subsequent federal bills relating to 
registration and community notification passed by voice vote, by unanimous vote, or unanimous 
consent.   
86  See 139 CONG. REC. H10,319, H10,321 (daily ed. Nov. 20 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Ramstad); 139 CONG. REC. S15,295, S25,310 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1993) (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
87  42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A).  The 10% figure marked a decrease from that in prior bills.  In 
its original incarnation, as proposed by Senator Durenberger in 1991, Wetterling mandated that 
noncompliant states would be totally barred from Byrne Grant funds, and later, in June 1991, 
threatened a 25% reduction.  See 137 CONG. REC. S8907, S8914 (daily ed. June 27, 1991); 137 CONG. 
REC. S6702, S6703 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (containing S. 1170).      
88  42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(1). 
89  137 CONG. REC. S6702, S6703 (containing S. 1170) (daily ed. May 23, 1991).  
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signed into law by the president in September 1994, this requirement remained,90 
but the law also targeted persons (1) convicted of “a sexually violent offense”91 or 
(2) designated by the sentencing court as a “sexually violent predator.”92  The 
registration requirement applied only to persons released from prison or placed on 
probation, parole, or supervised release after the Act’s implementation93 and 
afforded individuals ten days to register.94  
Sexually violent predators were subject to lifetime registration (with possible 
judicial relief)95 and had to verify their addresses every ninety days.96  The other 
two categories of registrants had to register for ten years97 and annually verify their 
home address by returning a non-forwardable form mailed to them by law 
enforcement officials within ten days of receipt.98  They were also required to 
provide a photograph and fingerprints (if not already on file).99  Information on all 
                                                                                                                            
90  Such an offense was defined as: 
[A]ny criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is comparable to or 
which exceeds the following range of offenses: 
(i) kidnapping of a minor except by a parent; 
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent; 
(iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a minor; 
(iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct; 
(v) use of a minor in a sexual performance; 
(vi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution;  
(vii) any conduct that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor; 
…. 
(ix) an attempt [to commit one of the aforementioned offenses] . . . .  
For purposes of this subparagraph conduct which is criminal only because of the age of the victim 
shall not be considered a criminal offense if the perpetrator is 18 years of age or younger. 
42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(A).   
91  Defined to include “any criminal offense . . . [that consists of] aggravated sexual abuse or 
sexual abuse” (as defined by federal law) or “an offense that has as its elements engaging in physical 
contact with another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse” (as 
defined by federal law).  Id.  § 14071(a)(3)(B).   
92  Defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers 
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory 
sexually violent offenses.”  Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C).  See also id. § 14071(a)(3)(D)-(E) (providing 
definitions for “mental abnormality” and “predatory”).  
93  Id. § 14071(b). 
94  Id. § 14071(b)(1)(A) (amended 1997). 
95  Id. § 14071(b)(6)(B)(iii). 
96  Id. § 14071(b)(3)(B). 
97  Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A). 
98  Id. § 14071(b)(3)(A) (amended 1997). 
99  Id. § 14071, (b)(1)(A)(iv) (current version). 
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registrants was to be shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.100  
Individuals who knowingly violated the law were “subject to criminal penalties in 
any State” in which the violation occurred.101 
Congress, tracking the Washington State provision, elected to make 
community notification permissive, not mandatory.  Information on registrants 
“may” be disclosed to law enforcement and government agencies doing 
background checks and law enforcement itself “shall release relevant information 
that is necessary to protect the public” regarding a registrant.102  
Wetterling further specified that the Attorney General was to issue guidelines 
that elaborated on the Act’s provisions,103 and in April 1994 the Attorney General 
did so.104  Although not specified by Congress in Wetterling itself, the guidelines 
emphasized that the federal requirements constituted a “floor for state registration 
systems, not a ceiling.”105  According to the guidelines, “[t]he general objective of 
the Act is to protect people from child molesters and violent sex offenders through 
registration requirements.  It is not intended, and does not have the effect, of 
making states less free than they were under prior law to impose registration 
requirements for this purpose.”106   
The guidelines noted a variety of ways that states could build upon the 
baseline requirements contained in Wetterling, including: 
 
●  broaden the scope of offenders made to register (both types of crimes 
and jurisdiction—e.g., those convicted in federal or military court);  
●  require address verification at more frequent intervals;  
●  mandate registration for longer periods of time;  
● make registration retroactive, affecting persons released before the 
law’s enactment;  
● require collection of other registration information (e.g., place of 
employment); and  
● require registration of juvenile offenders (as opposed to juveniles 
prosecuted and convicted as adults).107    
 
                                                                                                                            
100 Id. § 14071 (b)(2)(A). 
101 Id. § 14071(d). 
102 Id. § 14071(e). 
103 Id. § 14071(a)(1). 
104 Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,110 (Apr. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Wetterling Guidelines].   
105 Id. at 15,112. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 15,112–15,115. 
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The states enjoyed similar upward latitude with respect to community 
notification.  Federal law imposed no limits on the “standards and procedures that 
states may adopt for determining when public safety necessitates community 
notification.”108  With respect to which registrants should be subject to community 
notification, states were free to (1) engage in “particularized determinations that 
individual offenders are sufficiently dangerous to require community     
notification . . .” or (2) make “categorical judgments that protection of the public 
necessitates community notification with respect to all offenders with certain 
characteristics or in certain offense categories.”109  Finally, the guidelines observed 
that Wetterling only permitted, and did not require, community notification.  States 
electing to employ notification could authorize agencies “to release information as 
necessary” or allow the public to access registrants’ information.110  
Wetterling was not the federal government’s last word on registration—far 
from it.  Since 1994, Congress has repeatedly imposed new registration 
requirements on the states, pressuring compliance via its Spending Clause 
authority by threatening loss of ten percent of federal funds allocated under the 
Byrne Grant Program. 
This inclination manifested itself again in May 1996, less than a year after 
Wetterling became law, when Representative Zimmer introduced H.R. 2137, 
mandating that states utilize community notification.111  Concerned that states were 
“reluctant” to release information on registrants,112 and that a lack of community 
notification in some twenty states might leave communities vulnerable and 
encourage sex offenders to migrate in search of anonymity,113 Zimmer’s proposal, 
despite its obvious conflict with the regnant state-empowerment ideals of the 
Republicans’ “Contract with America,”114 won unanimous support from both 
Houses of Congress.115  In May 1996, President Clinton signed the federal 
                                                                                                                            
108 Id. at 15,116. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 15116–17.  
111 See 142 CONG. REC. H4451, H4452-53 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Zimmer).  See also id. at H4452, Committee on the Judiciary, Accompanying H.R. 2137, at *2 (“It 
has been brought to the attention of the . . . Committee . . . that notwithstanding the clear intent of 
Congress that relevant information about these offenders be released to the public . . . some law 
enforcement agencies are still reluctant to do so.”).   
112 See id. at H4451 (statement of Rep. McCollum).  
113 Minor & Miscellaneous Bills (Part 2) Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 98–102 (1996) (statement of Rep. Dick Zimmer, H.R. on the 
Judiciary).     
114 See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK 
ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellas eds., 
1994).     
115 In the House, the vote in favor of the amendment was 418-0 and the Senate passed the bill 
by unanimous consent.  For fuller discussion of the votes, including vote changes by individual 
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Megan’s Law.  With Richard and Maureen Kanka, Patty Wetterling, and the father 
of Polly Klaas at his side at the White House Rose Garden signing ceremony, 
Clinton remarked: 
 
From now on, every State in the country will be required by law to tell a 
community when a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst.  We 
respect people’s rights, but today America proclaims there is no greater 
right than a parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love.  Today 
America warns: If you dare prey on our children, the law will follow you 
wherever you go, State to State, town to town.  Today America circles 
the wagon[s] around our children.116   
 
Later, in his weekly radio address to the nation, President Clinton invoked the 
memory of Megan Kanka and emphasized the informational empowerment 
premise of the new federal mandate: 
 
Nothing is more important than keeping our children safe. . . . That’s 
why in the crime bill we required every state in the country to compile a 
registry of sex offenders, and gave states the power to notify 
communities about child sex offenders and violent sex offenders that 
move into their neighborhoods. 
 
But that wasn’t enough, and last month I signed Megan’s [L]aw.  That 
insists that states tell a community whenever a dangerous sexual predator 
enters its midst.  Too many children and their families have paid a 
terrible price because parents didn’t know about the dangers hidden in 
their own neighborhood.  Megan’s [L]aw, named after a seven-year-old 
girl taken so wrongly at the beginning of her life, will help to prevent 
more of these terrible crimes.117  
  
And in a later address, he continued: 
 
We are following through on our commitment to keep track of these 
criminals—not just in a single state, but wherever they go, wherever they 
move, so that parents and police have the warning they need to protect 
                                                                                                                            
House members accounting for the final outcome, see LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, 
AND POPULISM 179–80 (1998). 
116 Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 763–64 
(1996).  
117 President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address (CNN radio broadcast June 22, 1996), transcript 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/US/9606/22/clinton.radio/transcript.html. 
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our children. . . .  Deadly criminals don’t stay within state lines, so 
neither should law enforcement’s tools to stop them.118 
 
With Megan’s Law, the federal government did not now merely permit 
community notification.  States were instructed that they “shall release relevant 
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person 
required to register.”119  Again, guidelines issued by the Attorney General 
elaborated on the new law,120 this time specifying the ways in which the states 
would not satisfy federal community notification expectations.  States wishing to 
receive Byrne Grant funds could not merely release registrants’ information to law 
enforcement, government agencies, victims, or potential employers.  Nor could 
they comply by affording “purely permissive or discretionary authority” to 
officials to conduct notification.  Rather, notification in some form and to some 
extent was required.121   
The guidelines emphasized, however, that states retained discretion over 
which registrants in particular would be subject to community notification and how 
information on registrants would be disseminated.122  Citing state experiences, the 
guidelines identified several ways the new community notification requirement 
could be satisfied.  States could:  
 
(1)  conduct risk assessments of all registrants, and release information in 
accord with assessed risk levels; 
(2)  release information on registrants convicted of certain offenses, for 
instance persons convicted of child molestation, or recidivist sexual 
offenders; or  
(3)  make registrant information available to the public for inspection 
upon their request, and make judgments about which individual 
registrants or classes of registrants are covered and what 
information will be disclosed concerning these registrants.123     
 
                                                                                                                            
118 Brian McGrory, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1996, at 
A1 (quoting President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address (Aug. 24. 1996)). 
119 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).  
120 Final Guidelines for Megan’s Law and the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,009 (July 21, 1997) [hereinafter 
Megan’s Law Guidelines].  
121 Id. at 39,019.  
122 See id. (“States do . . . retain discretion to make judgments concerning the circumstances in 
which, and the extent to which, the disclosure of registration information to the public is necessary 
for public safety purposes and to specify standards and procedures for making these 
determinations.”).    
123 Id. 
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The guidelines did not address how registrants’ information was to be 
disseminated, such as by means of mailings, personal visits, or community 
meetings.  Nor did they specify what qualified as the “relevant information” that 
was to be disclosed.  
Only a few months later, in October 1996, federal requirements were again 
expanded, with the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act 
of 1996,124 named after a Houston real estate agent who was sexually assaulted by 
a twice-convicted felon who had moved to Texas after committing his crimes out-
of-state.125  Lychner retained the baseline ten-year registration requirement but 
expanded the lifetime registration requirement beyond designated sexually violent 
predators to also include offenders (1) twice convicted of committing a criminal 
offense against a minor, (2) twice convicted of committing a sexually violent 
offense, and (3) convicted of aggravated sexual abuse.126  
Lychner also greatly enhanced federal involvement in the monitoring of 
registrants, creating a national database at the FBI consisting of registrant 
information provided by states, designed to allow the FBI to track the whereabouts 
of registrants.127  While Wetterling had required states to forward registrant 
information to the FBI, Lychner required registrants themselves to submit 
information to the FBI—if they lived in a state without a “minimally sufficient 
registration program.”128  The FBI, in turn, was required to verify these registrants’ 
identifying information and was authorized to release information as “necessary to 
protect the public.”129  If individuals failed to comply, they faced a fine of up to 
$100,000 and a year in prison.130 
Subsequent to Lychner, the U.S. enacted numerous other provisions, 
including:  
  
● In 1997, the Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act, which required states 
to implement methods to identify individuals as sexually violent 
offenders; required registrants who changed state residences to 
register under the new state’s laws; required registrants to register in 
states where they worked or attended school if those states differed 
                                                                                                                            
124 Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2006)).   
125 Lychner and her two daughters were killed in the explosion of TWA Flight 800 off the 
coast of Long Island in 1996.  Later that year Congress passed the Lychner Act in her memory.    
126 42 U.S.C. § 14072(d)(2). “Aggravated sexual abuse” includes among other things sexual 
acts accompanied by force or threats, as well as any sexual act with a minor under the age of twelve. 
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).  
127 42 U.S.C. § 14072(b). 
128 Id. at § 14072(c). 
129 Id. at § 14072(e)-(f). 
130 Id. at § 14072(i)(1)(a)-(b) (amended 1998). 
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from their state residence; directed states to participate in the 
national sex offender registry; required state procedures to ensure 
that registrants’ addresses were verified at least annually; and 
extended registration requirements to eligible offenders convicted in 
federal or military courts.131 
● In 1998, the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act, which 
modified how states were to determine whether a registrant 
qualified as a sexually violent predator.132  Also in 1998, the Fiscal 
Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Bill specified that failure of 
state registration violations warranted a maximum term of one year 
imprisonment for a first offense and a maximum ten years for a 
subsequent offense.133 
● In 2000, the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, which required non-
resident registrants to inform state authorities when they were 
employed, carried on a vocation, or enrolled as a student at colleges 
and universities, and apprise authorities of any change in status.134  
Registrants’ information must be made available to the “campus 
community,” a requirement institutions have satisfied by making the 
information available upon request or by maintaining a campus-
specific registry.135  
● In 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act, which required 
that each state create and maintain an Internet web site making 
registrants’ information available to the public and directed the 
Department of Justice to maintain an Internet site with links to each 
state web site.136  
● In 2005, implemented the National Sex Offender Public Registry (later 
renamed the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Registry), to 
be maintained by the Department of Justice, which assembles on 
                                                                                                                            
131 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration 
Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 115, 111 Stat. 2440, 2461-67. 
132 Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998 Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 102(2), 
112 Stat. 2974, 2975-76. 
133 Pub. L. No. 105-277, Tit. 13, § 123, 112 Stat. 2681-72-73 (1998). 
134 Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1601(b)-(c), 114 Stat. 1537, 
1538 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 14071(j)).  
135 See Richard Tewksbury & Matthew Lees, Sex Offenders on Campus: University-Based Sex 
Offender Registries and the Collateral Consequences of Registration, 70 FED. PROBATION 50, 51 
(2007). 
136 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
[PROTECT] Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).  
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one web site links to state registries and creates a searchable 
national registry.137   
 
Most recently, in 2006, by voice votes in both the House and Senate, and with 
more than three dozen co-sponsors, Congress adopted its most extensive array of 
state directives to date.  The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 
(AWA)138 was signed by President Bush on July 27, 2006, twenty-five years to the 
day after six-year-old Adam Walsh disappeared from a Florida mall.  While named 
after Adam Walsh, and enacted in recognition of the advocacy work of his parents 
John and Reve Walsh (the former later became host of the popular television show 
“America’s Most Wanted”),139 the AWA established the Jacob Wetterling, Megan 
Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Program,140 and named several of its constituent programs after other victims.141  
In addition to creating the first federal involuntary civil commitment law (targeting 
“sexually dangerous persons”),142 and creating a national child abuse and neglect 
registry,143 the AWA substantially overhauled federal registration and community 
notification policy, in the process expressly repealing the Wetterling Act, Megan’s 
Law, and the Lychner Act.144  The AWA seeks, in the words of Congress, to 
establish a “comprehensive national system for the registration [of sex offenders 
and offenders against children].”145  Jurisdictions wishing to receive their total 
allocation of funds under the Byrne Act program must “maintain a jurisdiction-
wide sex offender registry conforming to the requirements” of the AWA’s 
provisions.146  
                                                                                                                            
137 S. 792, 109th Cong. (2005) (directing the Attorney General to make available a national 
registry via the Internet), available at http://www.nsopr.gov. 
138 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). 
139 Id. at § 2, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).  
140 42 U.S.C. § 16902 (2006).  The law was enacted “in response to the vicious attacks by 
violent predators” against seventeen specified victims (including three adult females), exclusive of 
Adam Walsh.  See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).      
141 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006) (establishing “Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public 
Website”); 42 U.S.C. § 16988 (2006) (establishing “Jessica Lunsford Address Verification Grant 
Program”); 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A) (2006) (“Amie Zyla Expansion of Sex Offense Definition”). 
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). 
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 16990 (2006).  The registry is limited to “substantiated cases” of abuse and 
neglect and access to it is to be limited to government agencies (and their agents) in the child 
protective service field.  Id. § 16990(e).     
144 Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 129, 120 Stat. 587, 6000-601(2006). 
145 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). 
146 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a) (2006). 
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Like Megan’s Law in 1996,147 the AWA was motivated by concern over the 
variations in state registration and notification laws and their perceived laxness.  
Yet in 2006 this concern was much more palpable, with legislators repeatedly 
condemning state “loopholes,” “disparities,” and “deficiencies,” which purportedly 
allowed an excess of 100,000 registrants to become “lost.”148  As Senator Orrin 
Hatch (R-UT), a co-sponsor of the bill explained, the AWA created “uniform 
standards for the registration of sex offenders,” emphasizing that it was  
 
critical to sew together the patch-work quilt of 50 different State attempts 
to identify and keep track of sex offenders. . . . Laws regarding 
registration for sex offenders have not been consistent from State to 
State[;] now all states will lock arms and present a unified front in the 
battle to protect children.  Web sites that have been weak in the past, due 
to weak laws and haphazard updating and based on inaccurate 
information, will now be accurate, updated, and useful for finding sex 
offenders.149  
 
Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), another co-sponsor, urged that the AWA was 
needed to remedy perceived deficiencies in prior congressional efforts: “[t]his is 
about uniting 50 States in common purpose and in league with one another to 
prevent these lowlifes from slipping through the cracks.  So we recognize that what 
we have done in the past did not do all we wanted to do.”150  State registration and 
notification laws, according to Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), had “proved to be 
relatively ineffective, which requires the Federal Government to act on the national 
                                                                                                                            
147 See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text; see also 142 CONG. REC. H4452, H4453 
(daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer) (urging adoption of the federal Megan’s Law “so 
that all 50 states [would] be held to a common standard of community notification.”).  In the final 
Megan’s Law Guidelines, issued in mid-July 1997, the Attorney General stressed that federal law 
“contemplates the creation of a gap-free network of state registration programs, under which 
offenders who are registered in one state cannot escape registration requirements merely by moving 
to another state.”  Megan’s Law Final Guidelines, supra note 120, at 39011.    
148 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 218, pt. 1, at 23–24 (2005); 151 CONG. REC. H7889 (daily ed. Sept. 
14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Green); 152 CONG. REC. S8018 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Allen); 152 CONG. REC. S8022 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. DeWine); 152 CONG. 
REC. S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist); House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against 
Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1355, H.R. 1505, H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and 
H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Rep. Poe); id. at 13 (statement of Rep. Brown-
Waite); 151 CONG. REC. H7893 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statements of Rep. Royce and Rep. 
Graves); 151 CONG. REC. H7920 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); 152 
CONG. REC. S8020 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell). 
149 152 CONG. REC. S8012, 8013 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
150 Id. at S8013 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:51 
 
76 
 
level.”151  Representative Ginny Brown-Waite (R-FL) stated that it was “important 
that we send a loud and clear message that Congress is serious about protecting 
America’s children from predators, those same predators who would harm our 
children, our grandchildren, and our neighbor’s children . . . .  Congress has a duty 
to act and protect our children nationwide, because these predators move from 
state to state.”152  Representative Mark Udall (D-CO), echoing another commonly 
voiced sentiment, condemned the current “patch-work quilt of [fifty] different state 
systems for identifying and tracking sex offenders.”153 
Ernie Allen, President and CEO of the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, emphasized 
what he saw as the difficulties created by the lack of “consistency” and 
“uniformity” in state laws that permitted registrants to “forum-shop” among states. 
“The public,” Allen urged, “has a right to know about all registered sex offenders 
living in our communities.  The amount of protection a child is given shouldn’t 
depend on the state in which that child lives.  There is clearly a need for more 
uniformity among state programs of community notification of sex offenders.”  A 
“seamless, coordinated, uniform system that works” was needed and states should 
disclose information on all registrants, not merely those deemed most likely to 
recidivate.154   
Roughly two years in the making, the AWA mandates major changes in state 
registration and community notification laws.  The first way it does so is by 
broadening the scope of offenses warranting registration.155  Whereas Wetterling 
required registration for persons convicted of a sexually violent offense or a crime 
against a minor, the AWA requires that all persons convicted of a “sex offense” 
register, a category that includes five sub-categories.156  Also, for the first time, 
juvenile offenders must register.  Whereas Congress previously required that 
juveniles convicted as adults register, the AWA requires that individuals age 
fourteen or over adjudicated delinquent in the juvenile system for the following 
                                                                                                                            
151 Id. at S8029 (statement of Sen. Specter).  
152 152 CONG. REC. H681 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Brown-Waite).  
153 152 CONG. REC. H5729 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Udall).  
154 Protecting Children from Violent Criminals and Sexual Predators: What Needs to be 
Done?  Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 19 (2005) (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO of The National Center 
for Missing & Exploited Children).  
155 Congress apparently wanted there to be no mistake about this, designating the subsection 
for the category of registerable offenses the “Amie Zyla expansion of sex offense definition” (see 42 
U.S.C. § 16911(5) (2006)) and “Expansion of definition of ‘specified offense against a minor’ to 
include all offenses by child predators” (see 42 U.S.C. 16911(7)  (2006)).    
156 The AWA excludes from coverage any offense involving “consensual sexual conduct”—if 
the victim was an adult, “unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time 
of the offense, or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years 
older than the victim.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C) (2006). 
2008] CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEDERALISM  
 
 
77 
offenses must register: (1) engaging in a sexual act with a child under the age of 
twelve; (2) engaging in a sexual act with another by rendering unconscious or 
involuntarily drugging the victim; (3) engaging in a sexual act with another by 
force or the threat of serious violence; or (4) an attempt or conspiracy to commit 
any of the aforementioned offenses.157  The AWA also requires, again for the first 
time, that state registration laws encompass tribal and foreign nation 
convictions.158  
Eligible individuals now must register, keep their registration current, and 
provide a new photo, in each place they live, go to school and work,159 and do so 
before completing a sentence of imprisonment for a registerable offense or not 
later than three business days after being sentenced for the offense if not sentenced 
to prison.160  When they register, far more information must be collected, 
including: social security number, employment and school location information, 
finger and palm prints, a DNA sample, and vehicle license plate number and 
description.161  Also, when registrants leave their home jurisdiction for seven or 
more days, they must inform the jurisdiction as well as the destination 
jurisdiction.162    
The centerpiece of the AWA is its tier classification system.  As noted above, 
the federal Megan’s Law left to states the question of how registrants were to be 
distinguished for purposes of registration requirements and community 
notification, and merely noted several possible techniques, including the two chief 
methods now used by states: one premised on the nature of the offender’s 
conviction (“conviction-based”) and the other premised on an individualized risk 
assessment (“risk-based”).  The AWA prescribes use of a conviction-based 
approach, based on a three-tiered registrant classification system:  
 
• “Tier III sex offenders” are persons convicted of an offense punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year and whose offense: 
? involves engaging in a sexual act with another by force or threat;  
? occurs after the offender becomes a “tier II sex offender”; or  
                                                                                                                            
157 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2006). 
158 42 U.S.C. § 16911(6) (2006).  With respect to foreign convictions, the AWA specifies that 
registration is not required if the conviction was “not obtained with sufficient safeguards for 
fundamental fairness and due process for the accused,” as specified in guidelines to be issued by the 
Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(B) (2006).  
159 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006).  In addition, when initially registering, individuals must 
register in the jurisdiction where s/he was convicted, if different from the jurisdiction in which s/he 
resides. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006).  
160 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b) (2006). 
161 42 U.S.C. § 16914(a) (2006). 
162 Id.  The AWA omits any mention of another emigrant population: long-distance truckers. 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:51 
 
78 
 
? is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, or a 
conspiracy or attempt to commit the following federal offenses: 
sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse; abusive sexual contact 
against a minor under age 13; kidnapping of a minor (unless a 
parent or guardian). 
• “Tier II sex offenders” are persons other than “tier III sex offenders” 
whose offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than one year 
and whose offense:  
? is comparable to or more severe than the following federal 
offenses, or attempts or conspiracies to commit such offenses, 
involving a minor: sex trafficking; coercion and enticement; 
transportation with intent to engage in sexual activity; abusive 
sexual contact; or  
? “involves” use of a minor in a sexual performance, solicitation of a 
minor to engage in a sexual performance, solicitation of a minor 
to engage in prostitution, or production or distribution of child 
pornography.  
• “Tier I sex offenders” are eligible registrants other than “tier II” or “tier 
III” sex offenders, a residual category covering misdemeanor 
offenses warranting a year or less imprisonment.163  
 
Under the AWA, tier designation determines duration of registration and the 
intervals at which registration information must be verified and updated.  Tier I 
offenders must register for a minimum of fifteen years and verify their registration 
on an annual basis in-person (prior law allowed for mail-in verification).  Tier II 
offenders must register for twenty-five years and verify information in-person 
twice a year.  Tier III offenders must register for their lifetimes and verify 
information in-person four times a year.  When verifying information, registrants 
must also submit to a new photograph.164  Any changes to registration information 
(e.g., home or work address) must be reported to at least one jurisdiction in which 
the registrant resides, works or is enrolled in school, within three days of such 
change.165   
The AWA requires that all statutorily eligible registrants register without any 
basis to challenge the registration requirement for the specified duration.166  In 
                                                                                                                            
163 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1)-(4) (2006). 
164 42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2006).   
165 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c) (2006). 
166 42 U.S.C. §§ 16915 (duration), 16916 (verification intervals) (2006).  The AWA, specifies, 
however, that certain individuals can have their designated registration periods reduced: (i) Tier I 
registrants, reduced by five years if they have a “clean record” for 10 years (i.e., 10-year total 
duration) and (ii) Tier III registrants who are juveniles, reduced to 25 years if “clean” for 25 years 
(e.g., 25-year total duration).  Id. § 16915(b)(2),(3).  For a definition of “clean record” see id. § 
16915(b)(1).    
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addition, all registrants are automatically subject to community notification—at 
least by means of Internet web sites that states are required to create and 
maintain.167  “[A]ll information about each sex offender in the registry” is to be 
made available, except for certain specified information (e.g., the victim’s name, 
the registrant’s social security number).168  In turn, registrants’ information will be 
included in and made available for public view on the Dru Sjodin National Sex 
Offender Public Website maintained by the Attorney General.169  
The AWA also adds new and harsher penalties for registration violations.  For 
the first time, federal law specifies a minimum penalty that states must impose for 
registration violations—a maximum term of imprisonment in excess of one year.170  
It also, again for the first time, imposes federal criminal liability for registration 
violations.171  Invoking its Commerce Clause (as opposed to its Spending Clause) 
authority, Congress has made it a federal crime for any individual required to 
register to knowingly fail to do so or to fail to update registration, and “travel[] in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or enter[] or leave[], or reside[], in, Indian 
country.”  Violators are subject to a $250,000 fine and maximum ten years in 
federal prison.172  Furthermore, the AWA specifies that federal law enforcement, 
including the U.S. Marshals Service, shall be used “to assist jurisdictions in 
locating sex offenders and apprehending sex offenders who violate sex offender 
registration requirements.”173  Pursuant to this authority, the Marshals Service has 
since launched Operation FALCON,174 resulting in the arrest of hundreds of 
                                                                                                                            
167 42 U.S.C. § 16918(a) (2006). 
168 42 U.S.C. § 16918(b) (2006).  The AWA provides that jurisdictions may exempt from 
disclosure “any information about a tier I sex offender convicted of an offense other than a specified 
offense against a minor”; the name (but not location) of a registrant’s employer; the name of the 
institution where a registrant is a student; and any other information the Attorney General might 
exempt.  Id. § 16918(c). 
169 42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006). 
170 42 U.S.C. § 16913(e) (2006).  Indian tribes, however, because their justice systems lack 
authority to impose in excess of six months incarceration, are exempt from this requirement.  Id. § 
16912(2).   
171 See United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d 846, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 109-218, at 36 (2005)) (noting that AWA “created ‘a new Federal crime’ where ‘[s]ex offenders 
who fail to comply will face felony criminal prosecution.’”).   
172 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006).  In addition, individuals who commit a “crime of violence” under 
federal law, the law of the District of Columbia, tribal law, or the law of any U.S. territory of 
possession, while unregistered, face a minimum of five years and a maximum of thirty years.  Id. § 
2250(c).  
173 42 U.S.C. § 16941(a) (2006).  
174 See Operation FALCON, http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals/falcon/index.html. (last visited 
September 5, 2008).  The acronym represents “Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally.” 
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individuals for alleged registration violations, and in late April 2007 the first 
sentence was handed down in federal court for a registration violation.175  
In addition, the AWA lays the foundation for a far more comprehensive and 
uniform national registry.  Each state must provide the Attorney General with 
information on registrants,176 which will be maintained in the National Sex 
Offender Registry to be operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and made 
available to all jurisdictions (yet not the public).177  The Attorney General, in turn, 
must maintain the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website, noted above, 
containing information on all of the nation’s registrants.  The AWA specifies that 
the website shall allow, at a minimum, “the public to obtain relevant information 
for each sex offender by a single query for any given zip code or geographical 
radius set by the user.”178  
Furthermore, the AWA creates a new federal bureaucratic apparatus to 
administer and monitor registration.  It authorizes a Sex Offender Management 
Assistance grant program to help states implement and satisfy new requirements, 
with bonus payments for early implementation.179  In addition, it establishes a Sex 
Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking 
(SMART) Office within the Department of Justice to administer standards and 
grants, as well as assist states with compliance.180  The AWA also imposes a series 
of reporting requirements on various federal entities.  The Attorney General must 
annually report to Congress on state efforts to comply with the AWA, and the role 
of the Marshal’s Service and federal prosecutors in enforcing the new federal 
failure-to register law.181  The Attorney General is directed to assemble a task force 
to study and report on the “efficiency and effectiveness” of risk versus conviction-
based classification regimes and various means to reduce sex offender 
                                                                                                                            
175 See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Sex-Offender Sentence Tests Adam Walsh Law, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Apr. 26, 2007 (discussing case of Wilfredo Madera, who had moved from New York to 
Florida without registering with Florida authorities).   
176 42 U.S.C. § 16921 (2006). 
177 42 U.S.C. § 16919 (2006). 
178 42 U.S.C. § 16920(a) (2006). 
179 42 U.S.C. § 16926(c) (2006).  The effort was not unprecedented: in March 1998 the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, part of the U.S. Department of Justice, created the National Sex Offender 
Registry Assistance Program, intended to help states in satisfying federal directives starting with the 
Wetterling Act.  The “Sex Offender Monitoring Assistance Program” provided funds based on the 
“annual number of sex offenders registered.”  See Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act 
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 607(i)(2)(B)(i), 112 Stat. 2974, 2985-86 (1998) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 14071 (2000)). Under this approach, it bears mention, small population states were 
disadvantaged and all states were provided an incentive to expand their registry rolls, even if not 
supported by sound policy rationale, and indeed even if registry information was incorrect. 
180 42 U.S.C. § 16945 (2006). 
181 42 U.S.C. § 16991 (2006). 
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recidivism.182  The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the 
Department of Justice, must by 2011 (with annual interim reports) conduct a 
comprehensive study the costs, effectiveness, and possible ways to improve 
registration and community notification.183  The AWA also authorizes a variety of 
grants to assist states in enforcing registration requirements184 and address 
verification of registrants in particular.185 
Finally, the AWA, like predecessor laws, is augmented by guidelines 
promulgated by the Attorney General.  Whereas prior express delegations of 
congressional authority relative to registration and notification were quite modest, 
the AWA confers broad authority to “issue guidelines and regulations to interpret 
and implement” the law’s provisions.186  Pursuant to this authority the Attorney 
General has issued extensive guidelines on the nature and scope of the AWA, 
including the critically important issue of its retroactive application.187  As 
interpreted by the Attorney General, the AWA applies to all individuals covered by 
its terms, including those whose convictions predate its enactment in July 2006.  
The guidelines specify that states must register statutorily eligible individuals who 
are incarcerated or under supervision, either for the registration-triggering offense 
or some other crime; already registered or subject to a pre-existing state 
registration provision; and (perhaps most significant) reenter the state’s criminal 
justice system as a result of any conviction—including for a non-registerable 
offense.188 
The upshot of the AWA is that the U.S. has mandated a considerable array of 
changes in state laws, including:  
 
● the range of offenses covered (e.g., “sexual contact”; possessing child 
pornography; and misdemeanors);  
● the retroactive extent of registration; 
● the duration or registration (e.g., fifteen-year minimum and new 25-
year category); 
● the capacity of statutorily eligible individuals to appeal and perhaps 
avoid registration; 
●  the registration of juveniles;  
                                                                                                                            
182 Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 637, 638, 120 Stat. 587, 643–644 (2006).  
183 Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 634, 120 Stat. 587, 643–644 (2006). 
184 42 U.S.C. § 3797 (2003).  
185 42 U.S.C. § 16988 (2006). 
186 42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2006). 
187 Final Guidelines for Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), July 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf [hereinafter AWA Final Guidelines].   
188 Id. at 8. 
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● the information that must be provided (e.g., employer and school 
information, DNA sample); 
● the frequency and method registration and updates are to occur (in-
person);  
● the jurisdictional origin of convictions (e.g., foreign governments, 
Indian tribes); 
● the geographic locations in which registration must occur (residence, 
employment, school); 
●  the penalties for registration violations (in excess of a year);  
● the scope of registrants subject to community notification, via the 
Internet at a minimum, pursuant to an “conviction-based” 
classification scheme; and  
●  the amount and type of information subject to public dissemination.  
 
As in the past, Congress afforded states a period of time to comply with new 
federal mandates.  The AWA specifies that jurisdictions have three years from the 
law’s effective date, July 27, 2006, to “substantially implement” its terms (as 
determined by the Attorney General), and thus avoid losing ten percent of Byrne 
Grant funds.189  If past experience can serve as a guide, federal pressure will have 
considerable influence.  As a result of financial pressure imposed by Wetterling in 
1994, a time when thirty-eight states had registration laws,190 by 1996 all states had 
registries (when Massachusetts passed its law).191  Likewise, in May 1996, when 
Megan’s Law was adopted, only thirty states required community notification in 
some form,192 but by 1999 all states had laws (when New Mexico passed its 
law).193  
Conformity, however, has not always been seamless, with resistance reflected 
in several ways, including passively, with states acknowledging that conforming 
legislation was motivated by a concern over losing grant money, rather than 
endorsement of the federal policies themselves.194  At other times, state officials 
                                                                                                                            
189 42 U.S.C. §§ 16924, 16925.  Alternatively, jurisdictions have one year after the Attorney 
General makes available computer software for the establishment and operation of “uniform sex 
offender registries and Internet sites,” if the software is available later than July 2009.  Id. § 16923(a).  
The Attorney General is also authorized to permit one-two year extensions of the deadline.  Id. § 
16924(b).   
190 James Popkin & John Simons, Natural Born Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 
11, 1994, at 64, available at http.//www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/940919/archive-
_013400print.htm.  
191 Doris Sue Wong, Weld Signs Bill Creating Sex-Offender Registry—Those Convicted Have 
to Register, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1996, at B2. 
192 See 142 CONG. REC. S4921 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dole).  
193 Roundhouse Roundup, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 13, 1999, at D5. 
194 See, e.g., State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 940 (Haw. 2003) (citing language in Hawaii 
legislative debates). 
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have publicly criticized federal strictures and expressed resentment over being 
subject to what they considered unfunded federal mandates,195 have been slow to 
comply,196 and, in isolated instances, failed to wholly codify individual federal 
requirements.197  Whether there will be full compliance with the AWA provisions 
will not be clear until at least late July 2009, the deadline set by Congress.198  
While six states hurriedly took steps to enact the AWA,199 in order to be eligible to 
receive “early bonus” payments authorized (but not yet allocated) by Congress,200 
others have expressed reservations, raising particular concern over the AWA’s 
insistence that juveniles be registered201 and the law’s retroactive scope.202  As the 
                                                                                                                            
195 See, e.g., Kirk Mitchell & Sean Kelly, Predator or Just an Offender?  A Colorado Law is 
Supposed to Inform Neighbors When High-Risk Sexual Offenders Move Nearby.  But It’s Been Used 
Rarely and Works Poorly—Some Say By Design, DENVER POST, May 29, 2005, at A1 (noting relative 
laxness of Colorado’s law compared to others and quoting state official as saying that state adopted 
community notification only under federal pressure); Mary K. Reinhart, New U.S. Law Puts Teen Sex 
Offenders on the Web, EAST VALLEY TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), Sept. 13, 2007 (noting that Arizona 
lawmakers and officials “suggested that the [AWA] might cost more than [Byrne funds] to 
implement”).  
196 See Federal Funds at Stake for 14 States with Megan’s Law Problems, 27 LAW 
ENFORCEMENT NEWS 7 (Nov. 30, 2001) (noting Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and 
Washington).  
197 Colorado, for instance, failed to require registration of persons convicted of non-parent 
kidnapping and false imprisonment of a minor, despite Wetterling’s contrary requirements.  See 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-22-101 (2006).  California and Delaware qualified that any kidnapping or 
false imprisonment be sexually motivated.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(2)(A) (2008); DEL. STAT. 
Tit. 11 § 4121(4)(A) (2007).  See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Summary of State Offender Registries, 2001 (March 2002, NCJ 192265) (noting jurisdictions with 
divergent provisions).  
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 16924(a)(1) (2007).  The Guidelines, critically important for the detail and 
guidance they provide on the AWA, were not issued even in proposed form until May 2007, and were 
not released in final form until July 2008.  Presumably, in light of this tardiness, at a minimum the 
Department of Justice will be obliged to invoke the AWA’s discretionary one-year grace period.  See 
id. § 16924(b). Moreover, as noted, jurisdictions have one year after the Attorney General makes 
available necessary computer software, and if the software is available later than July 2009, the 
Attorney General is authorized to permit up to two one-year extensions.  Id. § 16924(b). 
199 See John Gramlich, Will States Say “No” to the Adam Walsh Act?, available at 
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=273887 (noting Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nevada, and Ohio).  The Attorney General, however, determined for undisclosed reasons 
that Louisiana’s codification failed to satisfy the AWA.  Id. 
200 See, e.g., Executive Order Number 35: Gov. Riley Creates Governor’s Community 
Notification Task Force, Aug. 27, 2007 available at http://governorpress.alabama.gov/pr/ex-35-2007-
08-29.asp (noting initiative by Alabama governor to enact AWA early and secure bonus). 
201 See, e.g., Steve Peoples, Legislators Look to Toughen Sex-Offender Laws, PROVIDENCE J., 
Aug. 1, 2007, at B1 (R.I.); Luige del Puerto, Arizona Officials Express Concerns Over Federal Sex 
Registry Law, ARIZONA CAPITOL TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007 (Ariz.); Lisa Sandberg, Sex Registry Called 
too Harsh for Juveniles, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 17, 2008 (Tex.).     
202 See, e.g., Peoples, supra note 201 (R.I.). 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:51 
 
84 
 
cost of implementing mandates becomes clearer, even among states with 
conviction-based regimes like that of the AWA, further resistance can be 
expected.203  
 
C. Federal Motivations Scrutinized 
 
From 1994–2006, the U.S. engaged in a sustained effort to force registration 
and community notification upon the states.  Over time, federal prescriptions have 
become ever more exacting, culminating with the AWA, which contains the most 
ambitious requirements to date.204  This zenith resulted from congressional concern 
that state registration and community notification laws were “weak” and fraught 
with “loopholes,” and that their diverse nature created a “patchwork” permitting 
registrants to evade continued scrutiny, especially as a result of inter-state travel.  
These assertions, however, remain questionable.  
As a threshold matter, the issue of “weak” state laws presupposes a 
knowledge base not yet in existence.  Remarkably, almost twenty years after 
Washington State adopted its Community Protection Act of 1990, marking the 
modern resurgence of registration and the genesis of community notification, 
precious little effort has been dedicated to testing the mainstay suppositions that 
the laws: (1) deter registrants from re-offending, based on the belief that they are 
being watched; (2) enhance the ability of police to investigate and perhaps prevent 
acts of recidivism, based on knowledge of the whereabouts of registrants; and (3) 
empower community members with information on registrants, permitting them to 
take protective action and perhaps assist law enforcement in the monitoring of 
registrants.205  Indeed, not until the AWA did Congress expressly mandate 
evaluation of the core issue of the relative effectiveness of risk and conviction-
based registrant classification schemes206 and the effectiveness and costs of 
                                                                                                                            
203 For instance, when Oklahoma revamped its conviction-based system in accord with the 
AWA, 78% of registrants fell into the Tier III category, requiring lifetime registration and in-person 
updates every ninety days.  See  KOTV.com, Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Take Effect (Nov. 1, 
2007), http://www.newson6.com/GLOBAL/story.asp?s=7732295.  
According to one recent study, in all jurisdictions the estimated first-year costs of implementing 
the AWA will outweigh the cost of lost Byrne funds, often by substantial degree. In Virginia, for 
instance, it is estimated that first-year compliance would cost over $12 million while Byrne Grant 
losses would be roughly $400,000.  See Justice Policy Institute, What Will It Cost States to Comply 
with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act? (2008), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_SORNACOSTS_JJ.pdf.  
204 See AWA Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 72 (noting that the AWA “is more 
comprehensive and contemplates greater uniformity among jurisdictions than [prior laws] …in that it 
generally establishes a higher national baseline.”).    
205 For an overview of the limited research conducted to date see LOGAN, supra note 7, ch. 5. 
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 16991 [P.L. 109-248, § 637] (to be conducted by the Attorney General).  
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registration and notification more generally.207  This—twelve years after Congress 
began imposing registration and community notification on the states, and after the 
AWA itself mandated that states adopt a conviction-based scheme.  
Congressional concern over “loopholes” leading to the frequently quoted 
figure of over 100,000 “missing” registrants (itself an unverified estimate) is no 
more persuasive.  As has so often been the case, the scenarios publicly advanced 
on the House or Senate floor as evidencing the need for a legislative fix were 
inapposite.208  With the AWA, the February 2005 rape and murder of nine-year-old 
Jessica Lunsford served as a prime catalyst.  According to Representative Ginny 
Brown-Waite (R-FL), the tragedy could have been avoided if provisions such as 
contained in the AWA had been in place.209  John Couey, a registrant ultimately 
convicted of the crime, however, was “missing” because he failed to notify 
authorities of his residence change within Florida.210  The AWA’s provisions of 
particular relevance, its in-person verification requirement and heightened 
penalties for non-compliance, would have been of no effect, given that Couey 
could still have deceived authorities as to his address and Florida’s penalty at the 
time (up to five years) exceeded that required by the AWA.  The solution, if any, 
lay in enforcement by Florida authorities of Florida law (like the AWA, a 
conviction-based regime, among the nation’s toughest),211 and mandated home 
visits by police, the latter not required by the AWA.  As with other federal criminal 
justice policy efforts212 and environmental policy,213 empirically unsupported 
supposition fueled federal policy.   
                                                                                                                            
207 See 42 U.S.C. § 16990 [P.L. 109-248, § 634] (to be conducted by the National Justice of 
Justice). 
208 For instance, the identity of neither Adam Walsh nor Jacob Wetterling’s killer has ever 
been identified, and it remains unknown whether the boys were sexually victimized, undercutting the 
premise that recidivist sex offenders should be targeted by the laws.   
209 See 151 Cong. Rec. H7880 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Brown-Waite); 
House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1505, H.R. 
2423, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11–13, 23 (2005) (statement of Rep. Brown-
Waite). 
210 Robert Farley et al., For Police, Tracking Sex Offenders Can Get Tricky, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at 3A.  
211 See Top Ten Reviews Sex Offender Registry Review, http://sex-offender-registry-
review.toptenreviews.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2007) (providing state-by-state assessment of rigor 
of registration regimes). 
212 Aimee’s Law, enacted by Congress in 2000, is one such example.  See 42 U.S.C. § 13713 
(2000).  The law was premised on the belief that violent offenders, released prematurely from states, 
travel to other states to commit crimes.  Subsequent research by the Department of Justice, however, 
was unable to demonstrate the occurrence.  Using a 1994 cohort based on a sample of over 9000 
offenders released in 13 states, only 31 committed a sex crime in another state.  See Letter from 
Acting Assistant Attorney General James H. Clinger to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Dec. 26, 
2006 (on file with author).  The program itself was never funded and implementing guidelines have 
not been issued by the Attorney General.   
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Congressional concern over the “patchwork” of inadequate state laws 
(ironically, itself permitted by the “floor” imposed by federal law), theoretically 
fostering travel-evasion by registrants motivated to escape more onerous state 
requirements, is also questionable.  Not only does the concern bespeak existence of 
an optimal registration and community notification regime, again itself an open 
question, but also the phenomenon of travel-evasion itself.  While over the years 
some anecdotal evidence has existed of registrants forum-shopping for a more 
lenient state residence, no statistical evidence exists of the occurrence.  
But even if it were shown to exist, basis would still exist to question 
congressional intervention.  Unlike other contexts in which federal intrusion has 
perhaps been justified, what might be considered weak state registration laws do 
not impose externalities on their fellow sovereigns.  Rather, any weakness—
presumably resulting in enhanced recidivism risks among registrants—would 
mainly be shouldered by residents of the weak state; negative outcomes would be 
internalized, not externalized.  As discussed below, if a state is willing to be seen 
as a magnet for convicted sex offenders, based on exercise of its sovereign 
legislative authority, then federalism protects that choice.  Presumably, citizens 
aggrieved by the prospect will move to a jurisdiction ostensibly less amenable to 
registrants, and target-hardening will naturally occur among states wishing to 
preserve their citizen base.214  Moreover, even if New York’s law is thought weak, 
and a New York registrant one afternoon ventures to Connecticut to commit a sex 
crime, it is hard to see how the AWA’s more onerous requirements (e.g., in-person 
verification) will either (i) stop him from doing so or (ii) protect Connecticut’s 
residents against such victimization.215  
In this respect, federal registration and notification laws are unlike their 
environmental counterparts, which seek to limit possible state proclivities toward 
lax pollution standards, to the disadvantage of other states,216 and federal firearm 
laws, which seek to limit the spillover harms in other states associated with lax 
                                                                                                                            
213 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal 
Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004) (noting how federal 
environmental laws were prompted by false understanding of state under-enforcement and mythology 
surrounding the 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland).  
214 In reality, little evidence of this reaction thus far exists, with states such as Arkansas, New 
York, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington maintaining their risk-based regimes, amid a dearth 
of local political agitation for change. 
215 The shortcoming, of course, is a long-perceived one relative to registration and community 
notification in general, adding to the commonly expressed view that the laws only foster a false sense 
of security (for this and other reasons).  See LOGAN, supra note 7, ch. 5.   
216 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 14 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2341 (1996).  Whether such externalities actually incite a race-to-the-bottom of state 
environmental laxness, warranting federal intervention, has long been disputed.  See Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
553, 556 n.2 (2001) (citing articles advancing and critiquing the race-to-the-bottom assessment). 
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firearm regulation.217  If anything, states are wary of being perceived as being soft 
on sex offenders.218  The risk is thus not political laxness but rather 
overzealousness—a race not to the “bottom” but to the “top” (defined by ever-
tougher state laws).  
Finally, perversely, federal action might actually result in less demanding 
state registration and notification policy.  It remains unclear, for instance, whether 
the conviction-based approach mandated by the AWA is so over-inclusive as to 
undercut the desired goal of public vigilance.219  Concern also exists that the 
approach might enhance the prospects of recidivism among law-abiding ex-
offenders, who while not being prone to recidivate, might do so as a result of the 
negative consequences of community notification.220  As the North Dakota registry 
web site stated in October 2007 in justifying the state’s use of its risk-based 
regime, the “public notification of other offenders may have the unintended 
consequence of making them more risky.”221  Moreover, the conviction-based 
approach required by the AWA actually might be less inclusive, such as when an 
individual pleads guilty to a lesser offense.  Whereas a risk-based regime might 
capture such an individual on the basis of an individualized assessment,222 the 
AWA would not because the plea basis will drive classification—and hence 
duration of registration and notification, the intervals of verification, and other 
matters.223  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
217 See Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great 
American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 700 (2004). 
218 This “NIMBY” predisposition is vividly evidenced in the recent wave of state (and local) 
laws imposing sharp geographic restrictions on where registrants can live.  See Wayne A. Logan, 
Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV.  1 (2006). 
219 As the Supreme Court observed in an unrelated context, “when everything is classified, 
then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the 
careless….”  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  See also In re Registrant E.I., 693 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“[I]f 
Megan’s Law is applied literally and mechanically to virtually all sexual offenders, the beneficial 
purpose of this law will be impeded.”). 
220 See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Emerging 
Legal and Research Issues, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT 
337, 343–44 (N.Y. Academy of Sciences, 2003).   
221 See North Dakota Sex Offender Registry, North Dakota Sex Offender Web Site, 
http://www.sexoffender.nd.gov/FAQ/faq.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
222 For instance, such would the possible outcome in Arkansas. 
223 A solution might lie in adoption of a provision similar to that in Minnesota, which permits 
registration on the basis of a specified registerable offense “or another offense arising out of the same 
set of circumstances.”  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 subd. 1b(1).  
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III. FEDERALISM CONSEQUENCES 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, since 1994 the federal government has been in 
engaged in an ongoing effort to impose its will on the states on a matter of 
undisputed state concern—the community control of convicted sex offenders.  
With the Wetterling Act (1994) and Megan’s Law (1996), the U.S. required that all 
states adopt registration and community notification laws.  Federal policy, 
according to guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General, provided a 
substantive “floor” for states on which they could impose more stringent 
requirements.  With the AWA (2006), the federal government greatly expanded the 
“floor” of registration and community notification requirements, seeking more in 
the way of “uniform standards” for registration and community notification,224 
with the ultimate goal of securing a “comprehensive national system.”225  The shift 
was plainly not lost on Congress, with members being at pains to emphasize that 
the AWA’s provisions “constitute, in relation to States, only conditions required to 
avoid the reduction of Federal funding,”226 a clear nod to concern that the AWA’s 
prescriptions might run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering 
prohibition.227  Congress also invoked its Commerce Clause authority, for the first 
time making it a federal crime to cross states lines and fail to register.228  This Part 
examines the federalism implications of these developments.  
 
A. State Autonomy  
 
Traditionally, federalism, in its vertical (state-federal) form, has been thought 
to serve a variety of purposes, with state autonomy certainly figuring foremost.229  
Federal registration and community notification requirements have indisputably 
infringed this autonomy.230  With the AWA, federal intrusiveness has reached a 
                                                                                                                            
224 Activities Report of the Committee of the Judiciary, S. REP. NO. 109-369, at 16 (2006).   
225 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). 
226 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d) (2006). 
227  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
228 42 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
229 See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (“[i]t is an essential attribute of the States’ retained 
sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”); 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (stressing that states possess a “separate and 
independent autonomy”).   
230 The discussion here is limited to the AWA’s impact on the states.  However, the AWA also 
significantly impinges on the autonomy of tribes, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories.  For more on the 
effects of the AWA on tribal sovereignty, which requires that tribes either create their own regimes or 
submit to those of a state, see Virginia Davis & Kevin Washburn, Sex Offender Registration in Indian 
Country, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 3 (2008).  See also Timothy J. Droske, The New Battleground for 
Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex Offender Registration in Indian Country, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 897 
(2007). 
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high water mark, requiring major changes to state laws, for instance subjecting 
certain juveniles to registration and notification and requiring in-person 
registration verification.231  The AWA also mandates that states employ a 
conviction-based, tier approach to registrant classification.  The majority of states 
using an undifferentiated conviction-based approach will need to enact more 
refined laws that draw distinctions consistent with the AWA.  The dozen or so 
states that employ risk-based schemes based on individualized evaluation will need 
to radically overhaul their regimes. 
In mandating the comprehensive standards contained in the AWA, Congress 
did, to its credit, manifest some sensitivity to state autonomy.  The AWA expressly 
provides that a state need not adopt any aspect of the AWA if doing so “would 
place the jurisdiction in violation of its constitution, as determined by a ruling of 
the jurisdiction’s highest court.”232  If such a constitutional conflict does exist, “the 
Attorney General and the jurisdiction shall make good faith efforts to accomplish 
substantial implementation of [the law] and to reconcile any conflicts” between the 
AWA and the jurisdiction’s constitution.233  Under the AWA, “the Attorney 
General shall consult” with state officials “concerning the jurisdiction’s 
interpretation of the jurisdiction’s constitution and the ruling thereon by the 
jurisdiction’s highest court.”234 
Sensitivity to state autonomy, however, only goes so far.  No respect, for 
instance, is paid to state legislative or executive branch determinations.  Only a 
constitutionally commanded position, backed by a holding from the state’s highest 
court (and seemingly not even a lowly intermediate appellate court), will suffice.  
Moreover, the U.S. promises to “work with the jurisdiction to see whether the 
problem can be overcome . . .”235—surely an unceremonious way to refer to a 
state-based constitutional right.  If a jurisdiction fails to “substantially implement” 
the AWA, in the absence of a legitimate “demonstrated inability to implement” 
based on domestic constitutional dictate, or otherwise cannot satisfy the U.S. with 
an accommodation, it will lose its federal funding.  Adding insult to injury, the 
share lost by a jurisdiction will be reallocated to other more compliant states. 
                                                                                                                            
231 It might also require changes in the substantive criminal law of states, such as when a state 
defines a minor as someone other than less than eighteen years of age, as specified by the AWA. 
232 42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(1) (2006). 
233 Id. § 16925(b)(2).  The Final Guidelines for the AWA afford some apparent wriggle room 
for the Department’s assessment of “substantial implementation,” stating that the standard 
“contemplate[s] that there is some latitude to approve a jurisdiction’s implementation efforts, even if 
they do not exactly follow in all respects the specifications” of the AWA and the Guidelines.  AWA 
Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 10.  
234 42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(2) (2006).  
235 AWA Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 11(emphasis added).  
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Disrespect for state autonomy has been particularly evident in the exercise of 
rule-making authority delegated to the Attorney General.236  In the wake of the 
AWA’s enactment in July 2006 the Attorney General, under the auspices of a new 
entity created by the AWA—the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, 
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (“SMART”)237—has issued a series of 
proposed and final guidelines.  In February 2007, the Attorney General acted upon 
his specifically delegated authority,238 suspended customary notice and comment 
requirements, and issued an “interim rule” with immediate effect,239 ordaining that 
the AWA was to be retroactive in scope,240 a policy with huge implications for 
states.  In May 2007, the Attorney General issued proposed guidelines for the 
AWA as a whole, addressing a wide range of issues, as well as elaborating on the 
contours of retroactivity.241   
                                                                                                                            
236 See 42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall issue guidelines and 
regulations to interpret and implement this title.”); id. at § 16914(a)(7) (providing that the Attorney 
General has the authority to expand the scope of information, specified by the AWA, that registrants 
must provide state authorities for inclusion in their registries).  The AWA also provides that the 
Attorney General has the authority to augment the kinds of information falling under the AWA’s list 
of “mandatory exemptions” from community notification (e.g., the social security numbers of 
registrants).  Id. at § 16918(b)(4).     
237 42 U.S.C. § 16945(a) (2006).  The SMART Office is headed by a director appointed by the 
President, who reports to the Attorney General through staff in the Office of Justice Programs.  Id. § 
16945(b).  The SMART Office has the authority to: 
(1) administer the standards for the sex offender registration and community notification 
program; 
(2) administer grant programs authorized by the AWA; 
(3) cooperate with and provide technical assistance to the States, units of local 
government, tribes, and other entities in relation to registration and community 
notification and other measures intended to protect the public against sexual abuse and 
exploitation; and  
(4) perform other functions specified by the Attorney General.  
Id. § 16945(c).  
238 See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify 
the applicability of the requirements of this title to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of 
this Act….”).      
239 The exception can be invoked if an agency finds “good cause” and establishes that the 
customary protocol would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2006).  To this end, the Attorney General emphasized the dangers presented 
by delay as a result of not registering individuals with pre-enactment convictions, see 28 C.F.R. Pt. 
72 (2007), a not altogether convincing explanation given that the provision was to take effect six 
months to the day after the AWA’s enactment and thirteen years after the Wetterling Act, not to 
mention the two-year pendency of the AWW itself and the reality that persons targeted possibly had 
not committed a sexual offense for many years.   
240 See 72 Fed. Reg. 8894 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).   
241 See 72 Fed. Reg. 30209 (May 30, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 82).  
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The guidelines were the subject of a forum hosted by SMART from July 24–
27, 2007 in Indianapolis, Indiana,242 just before the announced deadline to submit 
public comments.243  The comments received reflect considerable frustration and 
concern over the substance of the guidelines as well as the process employed in 
their creation.  For instance, a letter from the chair of Idaho’s Criminal Justice 
Commission expressed concern over the “breadth of the duties of the state” 
resulting from the retroactivity requirement, calling it “an onerous and unworkable 
burden on the state and its limited resources.”244  A letter jointly signed by the 
heads of six New York State agencies concerned with implementation of the law 
urged that jurisdictions be afforded discretion on the retroactivity question: 
 
When each state first created its sex offender registry, it made a choice 
about how the registration requirements would be applied to previously 
convicted offenders. 
 
The decision on retroactive applicability raises substantial practical and 
policy concerns that are more appropriately addressed by the individual 
states. [Part of the guidelines] will greatly expand the pool of registerable 
sex offenders in New York State.  It will also require the state to search 
the prior criminal history of each person entering the criminal justice 
system to determine whether, at any time in the past, he or she was 
convicted of, or adjudicated for, a qualifying sex offense.  This is both 
burdensome and unworkable because in many case older records will no 
longer be available, or they will be incomplete or inaccurate.245  
 
In addition, the New York letter elaborated, retroactivity expands the pool of 
registerable offenders, which will serve to “exacerbate the difficulties that states 
are now facing in finding appropriate housing for sex offenders.”246   
The SMART office also received extensive criticism on the substance of the 
AWA itself.  Many jurisdictions expressed major concern over the AWA’s 
requirement that juvenile offenders register and be subject to community 
notification.247  New York’s letter, for instance, emphasized that requiring 
                                                                                                                            
242 The author was present at the gathering.  
243 The deadline for comments on the proposed interim role on retroactivity ended on April 30, 
2007; the deadline for the proposed guidelines ended on August 1, 2007.  
244 Letter from Brent D. Reinke, Chairman, Idaho Criminal Justice Commission, to Laura 
Rogers, Director SMART (July 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf. [hereinafter AWA Comments]. 
245 Letter from Denise O’Donnell, Commissioner NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services 
et al., to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 31, 2007), AWA Comments, id. 
246 Id. 
247 See, e.g., Letter from W.S. Flaherty, Superintendent of Virginia State Police, to Laura 
Rogers, Director, SMART (July 31, 2007); Letter from Jeanne Smith, Co-Chair Colorado of Adam 
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consultation of prior juvenile records, many of which have been sealed or 
expunged, was especially problematic because it contradicted “New York’s long 
standing policy that recognizes that young offenders have a strong potential for 
rehabilitation, and can be more effectively redirected into becoming productive 
citizens if they are not stigmatized as criminal or registered sex offenders.”248  “For 
many states, including New York, [the juvenile registration provision] will require 
a substantial change in the treatment of juvenile offenders.” 
More specific concerns raised by states included: 
 
• objections to the requirement that registrants’ vehicle identification 
information be made publicly available249;  
• the posting of offenders convicted of incest, which would permit the 
possible identification of victims250; 
• the interpretive and documentation difficulties associated with having 
registration based on convictions in other states251 and especially 
foreign nations252;  
• the interpretive difficulties associated with the need to incorporate 
convictions under aged laws (especially in other states)253 and 
                                                                                                                            
Walsh Compliance Committee, to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 16, 2007); Letter from Jeff 
Shimkus, Indiana Sex Offender Registration and Notification Team, “Feedback on Proposed 
Guidelines” to SMART; E-mail from Liane M. Moriyama, Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center, 
“State of Hawaii Response to the National Sex Offender Registration Act (SORNA) 2006, to 
GetSMART (via email dated Aug. 6, 2007); California’s Comments on the Proposed National 
Guidelines to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, attached to e-mail sent by 
California Deputy Attorney General Janet Neeley, to GetSMART (July 26, 2007) [hereinafter 
California Comments]; Letter from Robert S. Yeates, Executive Director Utah Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, David Karp, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Policy (March 28, 2007); 
Letter from Toney Newman, Alaska Division of Juvenile Justice, to Laura Rogers, Director 
GetSMART (Aug. 1, 2007); Letter from Richard A. Smith, Vermont Department of Children and 
Family Services, to Laura Rogers, Director SMART (July 27, 2007); Letter from Michael Hall, 
Executive Director New Mexico Sentencing Commission, to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 
30, 2007).  The aforementioned comments are contained in AWA Comments, supra note 244. 
248 O’Donnell, supra note 245.  
249 Shimkus, supra note 247 (contending that the information be available only to law 
enforcement due to concern over “public panic” and the possibility that the information would “taint 
eyewitness accounts” of abductions); Flaherty, supra note 247 (noting numerous problems). 
250 California Comments, supra note 247.  
251 Moriyama, supra note 247; Shimkus, supra note 247. 
252 Moriyama, supra note 247. 
253 E-mail from Diane Sherman, Michigan Criminal Justice Information Center, Michigan 
Department of State Police, “Comments on SORNA Proposed Guidelines,” to SMART (Aug. 6, 
2007), contained in AWA Comments, supra note 244 (“[r]etroactivity puts a work load burden on 
states.  Much research will be needed on old laws to determine whether they apply 
to…registration.”); California Comments, supra note 247 (asserting that creation of a database 
containing superseded statutes of California and other states “is not a feasible project”). 
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records that do not always specify the precise nature of the offense 
(e.g., the age of the victim, an important factor under the AWA)254;  
• the three-day time period in which change of addresses by registrants 
must be reported255 ;  
• the requirement that states post new registration information within 
three days256; and 
• the requirement that registration information be updated in-person.257  
 
States also offered more global concerns.  Virginia’s letter, for instance, closed by 
stating that the “proposed regulations would be extremely cumbersome to 
implement and cause Virginia to devote significant resources to the collection of 
information which would be of limited use.  Those states with strong registration 
programs should have the option of implementing the proposed regulations.”258   
In a lengthy submission, covering ten specific concerns raised by the AWA 
and the proposed guidelines, the National Conference of State Legislatures 
excoriated SMART, writing that the guidelines “compound the burdensome, 
preemptive scheme of the underlying law they seek to clarify.”  Furthermore, the 
NCSL stated that it was  
 
deeply concerned by the refusal of the SMART office to include them in 
the drafting and decision-making process.  The drafting process should 
be a dialogue between the SMART office personnel and the impacted 
stakeholders, such as NCSL, and not the product of unelected 
government officials’ unilateral decisions…[T]he process should be a 
give and take and not a decision made in a bureaucratic vacuum without 
the knowledge and expertise of those who would be impacted the most 
by such an obtrusive and overtly preemptive requirement.259  
 
In a posting provided on its website, stating the position adopted by the group, 
the NCSL similarly condemned the AWA’s “one-size-fits-all approach,” adding 
that  
 
                                                                                                                            
254 California Comments, supra note 247.  
255 Sherman, supra note 253 (recommending that period be five days, in light of difficulties 
registrants can have in securing identification, and asserting that the AWA “should make it easier to 
register not harder.”). 
256 California Comments, supra note 247 (requirement is “not feasible”).   
257 Moriyama, supra note 247. 
258 Flaherty, supra note 247. 
259 Letter from Carl Tubbesing, Deputy Executive Director National Conference of State 
Legislatures, to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 30, 2007), contained in AWA Comments, 
supra note 244.  
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These provisions preempt many state laws and create an unfunded 
mandate for states because there are no appropriations in the Act or in 
any appropriations bill.  Many of the provisions of the Adam Walsh Act 
were crafted without state input or consideration of current state 
practices.  The mandates imposed by the Adam Walsh Act are inflexible 
and, in some instances, not able to be implemented.260   
 
In early July 2008, thirteen months after being proposed, and well after the 
projected three-month period of revision, the Final AWA Guidelines were released 
by the Attorney General.  Running sixty pages in length, the Final Guidelines 
reflected little substantive change from those initially proposed,261 with the 
Attorney General rebuffing state concerns either because they contradicted the 
terms of the AWA itself or failed to qualify as persuasive bases to alter proposed 
guideline requirements.262  In response to state requests to loosen the AWA’s 
requirement of “substantial implementation,” the Attorney General stated that 
doing so would “effectively treat [the AWA] as a set of suggestions for furthering 
public safety in relation to released sex offenders, which would be dispensed with 
based on arguments that other approaches would further that general objective, 
though not encompassing the specific minimum measures that [the AWA] 
                                                                                                                            
260 See National Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/LAWANDJ.HTM (last visited August 30, 2008).  A similar sentiment 
was expressed in 1998 by a member of the Connecticut General Assembly, who stated that federal 
directives had “more to do with the needs of the home States of the various congressional committee 
chairs than they do with our States.  I think this has been a source of great frustration for many State 
legislators around the country . . . ‘One-size-fits-all’ Federal requirements really do not apply . . . .”  
Mike Lawlor, Creating Effective Sex Offender Legislation Requires Collaboration Between 
Lawmakers and Justice Agencies, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 110 (U.S. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 1998). 
261 Policy on juvenile registration is a notable exception.  In response to vigorous state 
objections, based on a technical reading of the AWA that would require registration of juveniles for 
less serious offenses, such as a 14-year-old having sex with an 11-year-old, the Final Guidelines 
deviate from the AWA.  In apparent violation of its required mandate to interpret not prescribe 
registration standards, the Office of the Attorney General devised a standard considerably less 
onerous than that tied to the “aggravated sexual abuse” standard expressly prescribed by the AWA 
itself (based on offenses set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2241).  Under the Guidelines, registration is required 
of individuals age fourteen or over adjudicated delinquent for committing (or attempting or 
conspiring to commit) (1) a sexual act with another involving force or threat of force and (2) a sexual 
act with another done by rendering the unconscious or drugging the victim.  AWA Final Guidelines, 
supra note 187, at 16, 63.  “Sexual act” includes genital and anal penetration as well as oral-genital 
and anal contact.  Id. at 16. 
262 See id. at 62–91.  Perhaps the most vivid example lies in the issue of retroactivity.  Giving 
short shrift to state objections, the Guidelines maintain their original position, focusing instead on 
assertions that the policy is “unfair” or “disagreeable from the standpoint of sex offenders.”  Id. at 
73–74.  The Attorney General obviously felt freedom to deviate from legislative requirements with 
juvenile policy, see id., yet to adhere rigidly to an expansive understanding of retroactivity, based on 
perceived statutory directive goes unexplained.  
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prescribes . . . .”263  With the Final Guidelines in place, states are now expected to 
conform to federal will.      
One response to the autonomy-stripping concerns noted might be the typical 
one offered with respect to conditional spending more generally: that states are not 
being forced to adopt federal strictures, but rather willingly and consciously adopt 
them, quid pro quo, in return for Byrne Program funds.264  Indeed, to many 
commentators, the congressional modus operandi of conditional spending is 
respectful of state autonomy interests,265 especially as compared to instances of 
exercise of Commerce Clause authority, which entail unalloyed federal 
command.266  By using honey rather than vinegar, and in the process liberating 
itself from the limits of federal law limiting unfunded mandates,267 and the 
attendant criticism typically attending such mandates,268 Congress extends its 
policy-making bailiwick beyond that permitted by constitutional text and 
tradition.269     
                                                                                                                            
263 AWA Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 75; see also id. at 77 (rejecting view that the 
AWA represents “mere advice” to states).  
264 See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (“We have repeatedly 
characterized…Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract….’”) (emphasis in 
original); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation enacted 
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the 
[S]tates agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 480 (1923) (conditional spending “imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which 
the State is free to accept or reject”).   
265 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define Proper 
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1010 (1995).  
266 With the AWA, it warrants mention, Congress has used a one-two punch, for the first time 
using its Commerce Clause authority to make registration failures a federal crime and authorizing the 
U.S. Marshals to apprehend violators.  As a result, what has heretofore been a violation of state 
criminal law, and a matter for state law enforcement, has been channeled into the federal criminal 
justice system—if the federal government so wishes.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). In addition, for 
the first time, the AWA made intra-state kidnapping a federal crime.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) 
(criminalizing kidnapping when the offender makes use of channels or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce).     
267 See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 658 (2000) (excluding from 
coverage duties that are imposed as a condition of receiving federal assistance); see also PAUL 
PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 190 (1995) (noting conditional funding approach takes 
Wetterling outside the Act).  
268 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth 
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Service, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 
(1993) (noting that “[f]ew contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as intensely as 
unfunded mandates”). 
269 See Davis v. Monroe City Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654–55 (1999) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that “Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside 
[its delegated powers] by attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds. . . .  [T]he Spending 
Clause power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the potential to obliterate 
distinctions between the national and local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal 
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Even assuming the principled use of conditional spending, however, the story 
of federal intrusion with respect to registration and community notification raises 
some troubling issues.  The first relates to the political salience of state decisions to 
bow to federal will.  Ideally, under the quid pro quo scenario of federal conditional 
spending, state submission to federal will in return for federal funds permits a clear 
inference of state endorsement.  With the AWA and its predecessor laws, this 
inference is clouded.  Because since 1994 submission has been tied to receipt of 
Byrne Program funds, an important pool of money used for criminal justice 
administration more generally, and not funds allocated specifically for registration 
and community notification, accountability and transparency have been 
significantly compromised.  
Second, serious question exists over the actual voluntariness of state 
submission.270  Whereas until the twentieth century conditional spending by the 
federal government itself was controversial for its perceived impingement on state 
autonomy,271 since then, especially with the advent of federal taxing authority,272 
the controversy has cooled and the federal role in state revenues has expanded.273  
                                                                                                                            
Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state concern, areas which 
otherwise would lie outside its reach.”). 
270 As Richard Stewart has observed, “‘coerc[ion]’ . . .  is an unhelpful anthropomorphism….  
The question . . . is not whether federal requirements overbear an hypostasized state ‘free will,’ but 
whether they unduly compromise a normative political conception of state autonomy.”  Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?  Problems of Federalism in Mandatory State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1254 (1977). 
271 See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS AS SANTA CLAUS OR NATIONAL DONATIONS AND 
THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 36–40 (1932) (calling efforts by Congress in 
the early-mid 1800s to bestow land upon states in return for internal improvements “attempted 
bribery of the States” and behavior that made the “States dependent on Government favor and 
subsidy . . . .”); id. at 143 (urging that “[p]ublic opinion must be educated to curb the tendency to 
plunge the National Government into action unrelated to its proper National powers.”).  See also 
DANIEL ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1962); Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the 
Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548 (1922).   
Indeed, in ensuing decades debate raged over the authority of Congress to exercise conditional 
spending authority, with Alexander Hamilton’s view that federal spending authority is broadly tied to 
the matters serving the nation’s “general Welfare” ultimately prevailing over that of James Madison’s 
narrower view that spending be limited to implementing one of Congress’s specifically enumerated 
powers.  See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994).  Perhaps even more 
exasperating to textualists, there is no “Spending Clause” as such, with the conditional spending 
authority deriving rather from Art. I, sec. 8 power to spend money for the nation’s “general Welfare.”  
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1994).    
272 See Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise 
of American Federalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130–31 (1993) (asserting that the 
Sixteenth Amendment, authorizing the federal income tax, afforded Congress the power to “extract[] 
money from the now-defenseless states and offer[] to return it with strings attached….”).  
273 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1918 n.24 
(1995) (noting that from 1943–1993 federal disbursements to states increased nearly 20,000%). 
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In recent decades, states increasingly have come to rely on federal largesse, with 
thirty percent of all state budgets deriving from federal sources.274  The Byrne 
Formula Grant Program has served as a chief federal funding source of state 
criminal justice activities, allocating $5.3 billion from 1994–2004.275   
While very recently Byrne funds have been dramatically slashed,276 the 
federal “stick” has been highly effective over time.277  Although there has been 
some state reluctance to follow federal prescriptions,278 such instances have been 
modest and isolated, as manifest in the rapid nationwide adoption of laws in the 
mid-1990s.  Given the broader needs served by the Byrne funds, and the pressing 
fiscal shortfalls now faced by states, such submission should come as no surprise, 
especially given the negative political consequences attending failure to secure 
“free money” from the federal government.279  In this atmosphere, state officials 
have readily succumbed, allowing state criminal justice policy, as one 
commentator stated with regard to exercises of Spending Power more generally, to 
“tag along after federal money like a hungry dog.”280 
                                                                                                                            
274 See Federal Funds Information for States, FFIS: Your State’s Eyes and Ears in Washington, 
http://www.ffis.org (last visited April 18, 2008). 
275 U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division, Federal Programs Branch, Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report—Fiscal Year Multi-Byrne Formula Grant Program, at 
http://harvester.census.gov/cffr/asp/Reports.asp (last visited September 7, 2008).    
276 In fiscal year 2005, the allocation was $483 million; in 2006, $435.6 million; and in 2007, 
$107.7 million. Id.  
277 Under South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citation omitted), federal funding 
pressure “might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” Since 
1994, Congress has set the penalty for state noncompliance at 10% of Byrne Program funds, which 
compared to the 25% loss initially proposed in Congress, stands little practical chance of prompting 
judicial concern.  Cf. William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights of Your People: 
Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
303, 319–20 (1993) (“Congress sets the terms of its offers quite knowingly—at just the ‘right’ 
level—to make them ‘irresistible’ and, accordingly, no state tends very long to resist.”).       
278 See supra notes 194–197 and accompanying text. 
279 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 876 (1998).    Such 
eagerness, it bears mention, is especially notable given vigorous state resistance to other recent 
federal mandates, such as the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which conditions state receipt 
of federal funds on state educational reforms—also traditionally an area of state prerogative and an 
initiative ridiculed as an unfunded federal mandate.  See Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REv. 885, 897–900 (2006) (describing state-level opposition 
to the NCLBA).  With registration and community notification, states have fallen in line much more 
readily, indeed expeditiously, even though the adverse federal monetary consequences pale in 
comparison.  See id. at 904 (noting that the Bush Administration warned that noncompliant states 
risked loss of all federal educational funding for disadvantaged students).  On state resistance more 
generally, see John Dinan, The State of American Federalism 2007–2008: Resurgent State Influence 
in the National Policy Process and Continued State Policy Innovation, 38 PUBLIUS 1 (2008).   
280 David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 92 (1994).  See also Lynn A. 
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’ Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
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This beguilement, however, does more than undermine state autonomy.  It has  
major practical ramifications for states.281  Ohio is a case in point.  Lawmakers in 
Columbus, eager to secure “early” compliance bonuses, voted to adopt the AWA, 
requiring inter alia disavowal of the state’s risk-based classification regime.  They 
did so even though the promised federal incentive money was not yet authorized, 
and indeed before the Attorney General issued critically important final 
guidelines.282  The legislation, which required reclassification of the state’s 25,000 
registrants,283 will require hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars to 
implement.  Under Ohio’s prior law, 77% of registrants were classified in the 
state’s least restrictive category—“sexually oriented offender”; under the new 
AWA-based regime, 87% have been classified as Tier II (33%) or III (54%), with 
their far more onerous requirements and attendant resource demands.284  
Commenting on the new in-person registration requirement in particular, a 
spokesperson for one county sheriff’s department stated: “It’s a disaster for us . . . I 
think many people didn’t think this all the way through.”285    
Nor did Congress provide funds to accommodate the broad gamut of related 
matters that carry expenses for states, including possible reductions in the number 
of guilty pleas (and attendant rise in jury trials) as a result of the harsher, non-
discretionary AWA regime,286 or costs required to handle judicial challenges 
prompted by changes in state laws.287  The AWA’s expanded range of registerable 
offenses, in turn, will possibly have significant collateral effect in those 
jurisdictions that have state (or local) laws restricting where registrants can live, 
                                                                                                                            
104, 105 (2001) (“[T]he greatest threat to state autonomy is, and has long been, Congress’s spending 
power.”).   
281 To date, despite promises by Congress to allocate necessary funds for implementation, very 
little money has been provided.  In late April 2008, the Department of Justice awarded $11.8 million 
in grants, of which $1.8 million was earmarked for tribes.  See Department of Justice Announces 
$11.8 Million to Help States and Tribal Governments Comply with Adam Walsh Act, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2008/smart08015.htm.  
282 See Margo Pierce, Next Comes Burning at the Stake: Is Ohio Getting Too Tough on Sex 
Offenders?, CITY BEAT, Aug. 15, 2007, http://citybeat.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=%3A014096. 
283 Sharon Coolidge, Sign-in Rules Tougher, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 30, 2007, at 1B. 
284 See Doe I v. Dann, No. 1:08 CV 220 (N.D. Ohio June 9, 2008). 
285 Rachel Dissell & Gabriel Baird, Ohio’s Tougher Sexual Offender Law Stalls, CLEV. PLAIN 
DEALER, Jan. 21, 2008, at A3.  In Nevada, which previously had a risk-based system, the number of 
Tier III registrants is expected to grow from about 165 to more than 2500.  Editorial: Sex Offenders, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 3, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 12574782. 
286 States might also face increased costs associated with an enhanced right to jury trials.  
While the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial typically only extends to misconduct that results in 
six months or more incarceration, the AWA’s more onerous requirements might prompt courts to 
extend the right to such situations, which would be of importance because the AWA itself targets 
misdemeanants.  See State v. Fushek, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2008). 
287 See California Comments, supra note 247 (noting likely challenges based on the more 
onerous requirements of the AWA).   
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exacerbating (from the perspective of law enforcement and registrants at least) an 
already vexing problem.288  
 
B. Decentralization 
 
A second way in which federalism values have been trammeled relates to the 
tenet that, by circumscribing federal authority, states will be free to enact laws 
reflective of local normative preferences,289 and allow for a greater range of 
choices for the nation’s residents.290  As the Supreme Court has stated, “the 
essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to 
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.”291  With this diversity, 
greater aggregate social welfare will ideally ensue, both by virtue of residents 
having the capacity to “vote with their feet” when displeased with state 
government policy,292 and the creation of conditions permitting a competition 
between states and the national government for the peoples’ loyalty on matters of 
policy.293   
Among the most potent criticisms of the decentralization model is that, at this 
point in the nation’s history, American social and political life is homogenized, 
                                                                                                                            
288 See Logan, supra note 218. 
289 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“[Federalism] assures a decentralized 
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”).   
290 Id. (noting that decentralizing function of federalism increases options by “putting the 
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”).  As Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have noted, 
the value of decentralization is not necessarily synonymous with constitutional federalism.  The 
former, as they point out, is a “managerial concept” entailing delegation of centralized authority to 
subordinate political units, whereas the latter is a “structuring principle for the system as a whole.”  
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
REV.  903, 910–11 (1994).  In addition, as Frank Cross has observed, decentralization requires that 
the subunits be delegated authority by the central unit, a scenario at odds with the U.S. federal system 
in which states possess sovereign authority in their own right.  Frank B. Cross, The Folly of 
Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2002).  Decentralization is thus possible absent a 
federalist governing structure retaining independent intrinsic value of its own.  See Sheryll D. Cashin, 
Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 556 (1999).  
291 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).  See also Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 
1029 (2008) (“Nonuniformity is…an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government.”). 
292 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  
See also, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 150 (2001) (the “imposition of a uniform national solution almost always 
will satisfy fewer people” than permitting local variation).     
293 See Todd E. Pettys, Our Anti-Competitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1353, 1358 
(2006). 
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resulting in little meaningful policy variation.294  While in general the point might 
be well taken, it is not true with registration and community notification policies.  
As is the case with corrections policies more generally, states—at least until the 
AWA—have manifested considerable variation with registration and notification.  
A significant minority, for instance, have employed risk-based classification 
regimes, which not only place premium importance on procedural due process for 
individual registrants, but also a risk tolerance: by subjecting fewer individuals to 
community notification, they also face false negatives (i.e., individuals not deemed 
sufficiently dangerous to warrant notification, but who actually do reoffend).  An 
even larger minority of states have refused to subject juvenile offenders to 
registration and community notification or otherwise placed limits on the extent 
and duration of their eligibility.295 
This variation, at first blush, would not appear to jeopardize a diversity 
interest, at least not one deserving attention.  After all, policy variation in the 
community control of sex offenders is a far cry from that usually in mind when 
decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition are discussed, such as that 
relating to tax or educational policy.  While the significant transaction costs 
associated with changing state residences might outweigh the perceived benefits to 
be achieved relative to the latter policies, sufficient to chill migration,296 variations 
in state registration and community notification regimes plausibly do not.  This is 
so when one considers the perspectives of two key groups: community members 
and registrants themselves.  
Community members, the primary intended beneficiaries of registration and 
notification laws, presumably are cognizant of the approaches taken by their state 
legislatures.  Because any deficiencies would harm them, and not residents of other 
states, the resulting situation would inspire residents to either pressure policy 
changes in their states or exercise their exit rights.  From the perspective of 
Congress, however, states (and their residents) should not be free to maintain such 
a system, a view that betrays the traditional understanding that state heterogeneity, 
despite its challenges, actually constitutes a benefit of the nation’s decentralized 
governing structure.297  Of course, one person’s “patch-work” is another’s 
                                                                                                                            
294 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 46 (2001); Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: 
Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 615 (2007). 
295 See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex 
Offender Community Notification Laws in America, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163 (2003).  
296 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE 183 (1998); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 387–88 
(1997). 
297 See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 IND. 
L.J. 459, 477–83 (2003). 
2008] CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEDERALISM  
 
 
101 
“diversity,”298 yet whether a criminal justice policy choice is wise on its merits has 
heretofore not been a legitimate basis to justify federal intrusion on state authority.  
State policies have not endured merely as a result of federal political sufferance.299  
With respect to registrants, the social value would appear attenuated at best.  
Why should we care in the least about ex-offenders, especially those convicted of 
an offense warranting registration?  One need not be a bleeding-heart civil 
libertarian to answer.  This is because of the wide swath of criminal misconduct 
that registration laws have often targeted, including, until Lawrence v. Texas, 
consensual adult sodomy.300  Such normative preferences were permissible; 
individuals not wishing to be targeted could move.  With the AWA, and its 
broadened range of registerable offenses (including misdemeanors), however, such 
breadth will be the national norm, and juveniles will also be forced to register.  As 
the reach of registration has grown—thanks in significant part to federal 
demands—the freedom-preserving benefits of decentralized governance have been 
diminished.301  This evolution has not only negatively impinged individual liberty; 
it has also limited the competitive capacity of states, which, as is their right, might 
wish to adopt a less inclusive approach in the interest of attracting beneficial 
human and social capital.302  
 
                                                                                                                            
298 As Lynn Baker has observed, “[t]he freedom of sub-national political communities to 
choose…, like any other form of ‘diversity,’ predictably results in a mixed bag of results.”  Lynn A. 
Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 (2002).   
299 See William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law: 
Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1737, 1740 (1988) (constitutional federalism, marked by structural limits on Congress, has been 
replaced by “political sufferance federalism”: “it is for Congress to decide to what extent it desires to 
make national law . . . .  Congress decides what in its view warrants national, uniform control.”). 
300 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting that at least four states made 
consensual sodomy a registerable offense).  Other examples of excessive registration requirements 
abound, including that of Alabama, which requires registration when one is convicted of posting an 
obscene bumper sticker.  See Ala. Stat. § 13A-12-131 (2005).  See also Human Rights Watch, No 
Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US 39–40 (2007), available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907web.pdf (noting inter alia that at least 5 states require registration 
for adult-prostitution-related offenses and at least 13 states require registration for public urination).  
301 As Seth Kreimer has noted, the “variation between states is desirable because it provides an 
opportunity for individual citizens to mold identities and choose their futures, and because an open 
national community follows from this right to experimentation . . . .  Federalism preserves freedom in 
part by the constitutionally protected character of emigration rights . . . .  [E]ach citizen may take 
advantage of the liberties offered by any state.”  Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance 
of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 981–82 (2002). 
302 See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice 
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 326 (2005).  For instance, a family with a juvenile 
household member, or an individual convicted of possessing child pornography, both within the 
ambit of the AWA, would be unable to affirmatively choose residence in another state based on its 
eschewal of the requirements. 
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C. Experimentation 
 
Finally, and related, federal intrusion has undercut the prospects for state 
experimentation, consistent with Justice Brandeis’s famous ideal.303  Criminal 
justice policy, especially relative to corrections, has been a fertile field for 
experimentation and development, leading to policy diffusion.304  Such 
experimentation has certainly marked registration and community notification.  
Indeed, registration itself originated first in localities (in the Los Angeles area, in 
the early 1930s) and later was embraced by the states (with California adopting the 
first state-wide registration law, in 1947).  Likewise, notification originated in 
Washington State (in 1990), and like registration, has constantly evolved.  Most 
recently, states have been engaged in public debate over whether a conviction or 
risk-based registration classification scheme is preferable.305  The policy debate 
was perhaps most visible in Maine, where residents and lawmakers in 2006 were 
engaged in heated discussion over continued use of the state’s conviction-based 
Internet registry after the vigilante killing of two registrants, one of whom had 
been convicted of “Romeo and Juliet” underage sexual misconduct.306  Similar 
debates have ensued over the appropriateness of requiring adjudicated juveniles to 
register and be subject to community notification.307  
                                                                                                                            
303 See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that individual states can serve as “laborator[ies]” and undertake “experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country”); see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (the nation’s “federalist structure of 
joint sovereigns . . . allows for more innovation and experimentation in government”).   
304 See Sara Sun Beale, Reporter’s Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When 
Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1295 (1995) (noting that 
“[m]any of the most promising trends in criminal law enforcement began at the state and local level, 
including specialized drug courts, community policing . . . and sentencing guidelines”).   
It is also worth mentioning that such reforms are not susceptible of the influential critique of 
Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman that states cannot be counted on to be engines of experimentation 
because they fear that other jurisdictions will “steal” their ideas.  Under this view, states will 
naturally free-ride on the innovations of others, and so too will risk-averse incumbent political actors 
who have little incentive to experiment and hence risk electoral punishment.  Under such 
circumstances, a collective action problem arises ripe for intervention by another actor, such as the 
federal government.  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and ReElection: Does Federalism 
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).  With criminal justice, unlike areas such as 
corporate law, states are not motivated to entice businesses with corresponding negative 
consequences for other states, providing an incentive to poach attractive policies.  
305 For discussion of the relative merits of the two approaches, see Wayne A. Logan, Sex 
Offender Registration and Community Notification Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 13–14 (2008).  
306 See David Hench, Panel to Consider Adding Details to Sex Offender List, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, July 23, 2006, at A1.  
307 See, e.g., 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans95/09500033.pdf (Illinois Senate floor debate). 
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Federal intrusion has quelled this discussion, disrupting what has been an 
ongoing natural experiment.  With Wetterling, in 1994, the states were pressured to 
adopt registration laws, and with Megan’s Law in 1996, community notification.  
As a result, with possible control states (those without laws) taken out of the 
equation, basic research into the efficacy of the two social control strategies was 
precluded.  Nevertheless, because federal law served as a comparatively modest 
and flexible “floor” for states, leaving them free to reach independent 
determinations, the opportunity for comparative empirical work on the particulars 
of the laws existed.308   
With the AWA’s enactment in 2006, the prospects for experimentation have 
been greatly diminished.  States are obliged to adopt federal requirements of a 
significantly broadened cast, including the scope of registration eligibility, 
increased durations of coverage, in-person verification, registration of juveniles 
and retroactive application, complemented by a conviction-based classification 
scheme.309  This even though Congress contemporaneously directed (for the first 
time) that empirical evaluation be undertaken on the relative efficacy of the 
competing classification regimes and the effectiveness of registration and 
notification more generally,310 which itself sharply undercuts confidence in any 
assertion that the AWA’s expansive set of prescriptions is optimal and warrants 
nationwide application.  
 
D. Whither (Better Yet: Wither) Federalism? 
 
Despite the foregoing federalism-based concerns, the extended federal 
intrusion has inspired little resistance.  In Congress, the most common ardent 
supporters of states’ rights—conservative Republicans—have remained silent.311  
                                                                                                                            
308 Alas, however, meaningful work never came to pass.  How and why a social experiment of 
such a magnitude avoided empirical evaluation remains one of the most curious aspects of the history 
of registration and notification.  For discussion of why this likely occurred, see LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE 
AS POWER, supra note 7, chs. 4 & 7. 
309 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 525 (2001) 
(“The debate . . . is likely to be a much less informed one if federal rules replace the different state 
experiments.”). 
310 42 U.S.C. §§ 16990–16991 (2006). 
311 As noted by Professor Kadish, the incongruity is not unusual for federal criminal justice 
initiatives.  “It is curious . . . that crime is the one area of traditional state and local concern where 
even strongly federally oriented politicians often support national intervention . . . .  In [the areas of 
health care or welfare] the same politicians pushing for increased federal criminal legislation turn into 
ardent federalists.”  Sanford H. Kadish, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 
1247 (1995). Nor need one need look far for examples of other inconsistencies, including the zealous 
efforts of Republican lawmakers to trump decisions by sovereign state courts in Florida in their 
efforts to super-impose federal will in the Terry Schiavo case.  See John Dinan & Dale Krane, The 
State of American Federalism, 2005: Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate, 36 PUBLIUS 327 
(2006).  
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To the extent federalism objections were voiced, they came from liberal 
Democrats.312  In 1994, for instance, Representative Jerry Nadler (D-NY)  
repeatedly spoke out on the federalism implications of the proposed Wetterling 
Act:  
 
What we are attempting to do here . . . is to mandate the States to enact a 
State criminal law and a State criminal [law] program . . . .  We are 
mandating the States under threat of withholding Federal funds as to a 
criminal law they are to enact.  The Federal Government should not be in 
the business generally of enacting and writing local State criminal laws.  
That is the business of the State.  The State legislature has ample policy 
arguments on both sides.313 
 
. . .  
 
When I hear [a colleague] stand up here and say that it is all of our 
responsibility, sure, it is all of our responsibility, but in this country we 
leave general decisions of criminal law generally to the States . . . .  In 
fact, . . . we are saying to the State, “If you do not do it exactly the way 
we tell you to do it, then we are going to take Federal funds away from 
you and we are going to mandate it . . . .”  This is telling the States, “We 
know how best to do it, we are telling you how to do it in the States,” and 
that is not something we ought to be doing in the criminal law . . . , 
especially when there are strong policy arguments that this particular 
                                                                                                                            
Of course, Democrats also show a circumstantial featly to federalism.  Indeed, the very same 
month that President Clinton endorsed Megan’s Law, he vetoed the “Common Sense Product 
Liability Reform Act,” which was motivated by concern over state law variations and damage 
awards, publicly stating that the bill would “inappropriately intrude[] on state authority.”  Neil A. 
Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A1.  See also Jonathan R. 
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a 
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1990) (noting that 
“[c]onservatives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever deference to the 
states happens to serve their political needs at a particular moment”).   
312 Conservatives did raise federalism-based concern in one instance.  The issue arose in 1997 
in the context of an effort to strengthen registration provisions, and centered on the decision of at 
least four states to require registration of adults convicted of consensual sodomy.  In response, 
Representative Chuck Schumer (D-NY), a strong supporter of federal registration laws, offered an 
amendment before the House Judiciary Committee that such states would be disqualified from 
receiving federal funds.  The amendment was defeated on the rationale that it would intrude on the 
policy making authority of states.  Dissenting members of the House Judiciary Committee, all 
Democrats, called the federalism argument “specious,” noting that the proposed legislation already 
“impose[d] a multitude of requirements on states.”  Comm. on the Judiciary Report, Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Improvements Act of 1997, 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-256 at 41–42 (1997). 
313 140 CONG. REC. H5612, 5613 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
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solution to this problem has real problems with it.  Let the State 
legislature deal with the specifics of how to deal with this.314  
 
Similarly, in 1996, Representative Mel Watt (D-NC), while initially inclined 
to remain silent due to the “difficulty of the issue,” ultimately exhorted his 
colleagues to “stand up for the Constitution and stand up for States[’] rights” and 
oppose [the federal Megan’s Law].315  Watt stated that “in this area, somehow or 
another we cannot seem to justify allowing states to make their own decisions . . . .  
All of a sudden Big Brother Government must direct the states to do something 
that is not even necessarily a Federal issue.”316  As with Nadler in 1994, however, 
Watt’s sentiment was forlorn and the legislation was passed with overwhelming 
support (including, ultimately, the affirmative vote of Watt himself)317 and signed 
by President Clinton in a moving Rose Garden ceremony in which the President, 
with Maureen Kanka at his side, endorsed a nationalization theme: “Today 
America warns: If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you 
wherever you go.  State to State, town to town. . . .  Today, America circles the 
wagon[s] around our children.”318  
A similar reticence marked evolution of the AWA.  While federalism concern 
was expressly voiced by outside parties in a handful of letters made a part of the 
House Record,319 such concern was only indirectly raised on the floor, with 
witnesses and representatives alike downplaying any effect, itself trumped by the 
avowed need for national intervention.320  In the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
VT) expressed concern over the AWA’s required registration of juveniles but 
                                                                                                                            
314 Id. at H5616. 
315 140 CONG. REC. H4451, 4456 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt). 
316 Id.  
317 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  The House Report, containing “additional 
views,” also omitted any express concern over federalism.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-555 (1996); Pub. 
L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).  
318 Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 763–
764 (1996). 
319 See 152 CONG. REC. H690 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of the American Civil 
Liberties Union); H.R. REP. NO. 218, pt. 1, at 285 (2005); 152 CONG. REC. H687-89 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
2006) (statement of Michael Z. Buncher, Deputy Public Defender, New Jersey); 152 CONG. REC. 
H686 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference 
of the United States). 
320 See House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 
1355, H.R. 1505, H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 26 (2005) 
(statements of Rep. Gohmert and Rep. Poe); Id. at 30 (statement of Rep. Brown-Waite); Protecting 
Our Nation’s Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: What Needs to be Done?  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 33 (2005) (statement of Tracy A. Henke, Deputy Associate Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice). 
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ultimately concluded that the bill struck “an acceptable balance” and vaguely 
related that he was “glad that those of us who were concerned about appropriate 
deference to the expertise of the States spoke out and were heard to some 
extent.”321  Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) expressed the sole other concern, 
again indirectly, by lauding what he termed the “compromise” allowing states with 
a risk-based regime (such as his home state of Massachusetts), which he 
characterized as “go[ing] beyond” the “basic requirements” of the AWA “by 
providing individualized risk assessments of each sex offender who goes on the 
registry.”  By “compromise” the senator referred to the AWA provision noted 
above that possibly allows deviation from the AWA’s regime in the event a state’s 
highest court finds that such deviation is constitutionally compelled, such as has 
been the case with the evolution of the risk-based regime in Massachusetts.322  
Massachusetts, Kennedy stated, 
  
has been vigilant in implementing a comprehensive and effective sex 
offender registry, and it should not lose much needed Federal funding 
where there is a demonstrated inability to comply with . . . this new 
Federal law. 
 
No state should be penalized and lose critical Federal funding for law 
enforcement programs as long as reasonable efforts are under way to 
implement procedures consistent with the purposes of the act.  It is 
essential that the Federal Government continue to collaborate and to 
provide support for State and local governments . . . .323  
 
Time will tell whether the “compromise” Senator Kennedy alluded to, which 
he termed “very important,” will protect the autonomy of jurisdictions such as 
Massachusetts.  However, as noted above, requiring states to achieve “substantial 
implementation” of and “compliance” with a federal directive, calling any barrier a 
state constitutional “problem,” and requiring a state to “consult” with the U.S., 
hardly manifests much fealty to federalism.324  Moreover, even if Senator 
Kennedy’s faith in the deferential capacity of the Attorney General to broker a 
state constitutional compromise is ultimately warranted, the litany of conflicting 
state statutes, rules, and policies, themselves not constitutionally commanded, will 
be accorded no deference. 
                                                                                                                            
321 152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8027 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
322 Id. at S8023 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“Each State will face 
challenges in the implementation of these new Federal requirements, and States should not be 
penalized if exact compliance with the [AWA’s] requirements would place the State in violation of 
its constitution or an interpretation of the State’s constitution by its highest court.”).   
323 Id. 
324 See supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text. 
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To students of state-federal relations, the foregoing account should come as 
no surprise.  In contemporary times, in contrast to the past,325 federalism has 
decidedly ranked as a second-order concern,326 with preferred substantive 
policies—certainly relative to criminal justice—reigning supreme.327  With 
registration and notification in particular, federal actors have been allured by 
enormous political benefits and faced no political risk.  Moreover, there has been 
scant push-back from the states.  Wary of being tagged as “soft” on sex offenders 
or being an obstacle to the securing of “free” federal money, state legislators have 
readily fallen in line.328      
In assessing this political dynamic, it is important to note that public discourse 
has never been meaningfully affected by the federalism implications of federal 
mandates.  If the terms of the debate were to be recast, if federalism were to figure 
meaningfully in the political discourse, the outcome might well have been 
different.329  As has been observed with opinion surveys seeking to plumb public 
sentiment, including the death penalty,330 it very much matters how a public policy 
matter is couched.  If federalism was salient in debate over enactment of 
registration and community notification laws, then resistance from state residents 
might filter up to federal law-makers, as Herbert Wechsler’s political safeguards 
                                                                                                                            
325 See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.  Such concern, it should be recognized, was 
not uniform.  That this was so was evidenced by Representative Thetus Sims (D-TN), who in 1910 
inveighed against what he saw as undue federalism concern prompted by the Mann Act, which 
eventually passed by voice vote: “how any man can haggle or higgle over a constitutional provision” 
in the face of “white slave” traffic “is more than I can [imagine].” 45 CONG. REC. 811 (1910). 
326 See generally Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 
131–37 (2004).  
327 See William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 
724 (1995) (“It may win votes . . . to claim that one is in favor of returning power to the state—it is 
seldom a vote winner to assert that one is not going to vote for a popular criminal measure on the 
grounds that it conflicts with a theoretical vision of federalism.”).   
328 The reaction parallels the behavior of states more generally down the years when the 
federal government enacts criminal laws permitting concurrent jurisdiction (e.g., drug or firearm 
offenses) and states mount little resistance.  See Richman, supra note 39, at 404–05.  But as noted at 
the outset, such silence might be in large part explained by the reality that with concurrent 
federalization states benefit from the U.S. handling a part (albeit small) of their workloads.  Here, 
federal action only serves to increase the burden on states.  
329 Standing up for federalism potentially raises a complicated question for federal legislators, 
especially liberals, given the doctrine’s historic deployment by opponents of civil rights and New 
Deal-era initiatives.  Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 
1065 (1995).  However, it is important to recognize that states’ rights swing both ways.  See Lynn A. 
Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 (2002) (noting that the 
doctrine has been invoked to preserve racial hegemony (e.g., resisting federal anti-lynching laws) and 
to preserve individual liberty (e.g., resisting federal laws condoning or facilitating slavery)). 
330 See Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism 
for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1370 (2002).     
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model would dictate.331  Support for this possibility lies in surveys showing that 
citizen opinions on preferred allocation of governmental authority varies in accord 
with policy area, with criminal justice decidedly being within the ambit of state 
(and local) government.332  As Cindy Kam and Robert Mikos observe, “by 
exposing the public to federalism appeals . . . , elite debate can make federalism a 
more salient consideration in the minds of citizens.”333  However, such attention 
(from state and federal lawmakers alike) has not been in evidence with registration 
and community notification, removing what might be a hedge against federal 
intrusion. 
 
IV. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY  
 
The preceding discussion highlighted basic doctrinal objections to federal 
intrusion.  Yet such objections arguably only go so far, as critics of “abstract”334 or 
“puppy”335 federalism are wont to assert.  Importantly, in themselves they do not 
resolve the question of whether national criminal justice policy, deriving from the 
federal legislative process, is predisposed to being inferior to that deriving from 
states.  Nor, presuming the epistemic appeal of a federal policy-making role, does 
the foregoing determine what form such a policy should take.  This Part first 
considers whether the federal law-making process is well-suited to the task of 
enlightened criminal justice policy creation, using the history of registration and 
community notification as a case study.  Later, assuming suitability of a federal 
role, discussion turns to the question of what form federal policy should assume.  
 
A. The U.S. as a Central Planner  
 
Historically, federal involvement in policy-making has been thought to have 
several benefits.  Most significant, the national legislative process itself has been 
regarded as superior because it is executed, in James Madison’s words, by leaders 
more likely to have “enlightened views and virtuous sentiments [that] render them 
                                                                                                                            
331 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
332 See PHILLIP W. ROEDER, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES 99, 116, 203 (1994). 
333 Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1715 
(2007).  
334 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 695 (2008). 
335 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 294.  But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
157 (1992) (stating that deference to federalism is warranted “even if one could prove that [it] 
secured no advantages to anyone”).    
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superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice[.]”336  The federal process, 
it is said, can “readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of 
a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.”337  In devising policy 
outcomes, it can also utilize subcommittees with special expertise on particular 
issues, augmented by access to superior resources for research and analysis.338  As 
a result of these features, the federal policy-making apparatus can be expected to 
achieve optimized policy outcomes.  
Little evidence exists, however, that this idealized scenario reflects reality.  
Congress, it is widely acknowledged, often suffers from dysfunctional paralysis, so 
much so that states have taken the lead in numerous areas of national significance, 
including environmental protection, immigration, health care, and welfare 
reform.339  Worse yet, when Congress does act, the prevailing institutional 
dynamic is such that it fails to inspire optimism, with the non-deliberative methods 
characteristic of more recent Congresses,340 aversion for expert input,341 and undue 
interest group influence342 raising particular concern. 
Congressional dysfunction is especially evident with criminal justice policy.  
As Rachel Barkow has observed, when it comes to criminal justice Congress is 
predisposed to enact laws of “the ‘feel-good, do-something’ variety rather than to 
seek out the most cost-effective way to address a particular problem.”343  One need 
                                                                                                                            
336 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
Hamilton contended that while initially individuals would repose greater trust in their state leaders, 
this would change over time if the federal government excelled and the states faltered.  See THE 
FEDERALIST No. 17, supra at 1199 (Alexander Hamilton).    
337 Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
338 See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 199, 209 (1971); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1179 (2001). 
339 This is not to say, of course, that vertical (state-federal) policy diffusion does not occur in 
the reverse, with the federal government at times acting in an agenda-setting capacity by highlighting 
the need to act on issues and inspiring states to pursue innovations considered but not acted upon by 
Congress.  For discussion of several such instances since the 1980s (e.g., medical savings accounts 
after Congress failed to enact the Health Security Act), see ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC 
LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 67–103 (2007). 
340 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE 
U.S. CONGRESS (3d ed. 2007). 
341 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from 
Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525 (2005).  
342 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of 
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1539–40 (2007).   
343 Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 
1303 (2005).  See also David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 
28 CRIME & JUST. 71, 121–22 (2001) (observing that the political symbolism of crime “is much easier 
when it is disconnected from the reality of managing scarce resources”).  As Professor Barkow has 
observed elsewhere:  
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look far for support for these assertions, including the ongoing federal proclivity 
for get-tough policies resulting in mass incarceration,344 which stand in stark 
contrast to state efforts to scale back use of harsh mandatory minimums, enhance 
use of community corrections, and pursue evidence-based programmatic efforts 
intended to lower recidivism and enhance public safety.345 “When severity is 
politically costless,” as it is for Congress, as William Stuntz has observed, “one 
can expect to see severe laws.”346  
This orientation, in turn, is affected by a variety of factors that distinguish 
criminal justice from other policy areas.  Notably, unlike other areas attracting the 
attention of Congress, criminal justice is often driven and justified by “common 
sense,” which can moot any possible perceived need for expert input.  Moreover, 
unlike other areas in which Congress often seeks to intrude on state prerogative—
such as securities or environmental regulation, products liability, or electronic 
identity theft—the impetus for change does not come from politically powerful 
private sector entities, themselves often opposed by public interest groups.347  
                                                                                                                            
Groups representing the interests of defendants are politically weak at all levels of 
government, but it is more likely that advocates making arguments for shorter sentences 
on the basis of cost concerns will have more sway at the state level.  States are more 
sensitive to sentencing costs because . . . states cannot carry deficits to pay for their crime 
policies.  As a result, state actors tend to see the budget in zero-sum terms, and crime 
expenditures are viewed with greater scrutiny because money saved on incarceration 
costs could be spent elsewhere. 
Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1721 (2006).  
See also Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags 
to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 774–75 (2005) (noting comparative absence of fiscal 
constraint operative on Congress).   
344 While state prison populations increased 300% from 1980–2001, the growth in federal 
prison populations was 600%.  Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2001, (U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Wash., D.C.) BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., July 2002, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p01.pdf. 
345 See generally ALISON LAWRENCE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION: 2007 ACTION, 2008 OUTLOOK (Jan. 2008), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/07sentencingreport.pdf.  
346 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 
806 (2006).   
347 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2007).  As Professor Hills notes, state 
laws “are an important influence on Congress’s agenda.  They spur interest groups to raise issues that 
might otherwise never receive congressional attention.”  Id. at 20.  For instance, the “patchwork” of 
more stringent (not lax, as with the AWA) state laws relating to health, safety and environmental 
concerns have prompted industry to seek uniform (and less onerous) standards in Congress.  See Eric 
Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2007 at A1.  For discussion of why interest groups are especially predisposed to seek out national 
legislative solutions, as opposed to those at the state level, see Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference 
to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation 
of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271–73 (1990). 
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Rather, policy entrepreneurs348 are very often members of Congress who stand to 
gain substantial political benefit and face little organized opposition.349 
The history of federal registration and community notification laws provides a 
compelling case study of these tendencies.  Congress, in tandem with election 
cycles,350 has created and imposed from on-high policies that it knows will not 
have significant impact on the federal criminal justice system.351  Unlike even the 
federalization of crime, where federal resources (however modest) must be 
dedicated to enforcement, the burdens and costs of registration and notification fall 
squarely on the states,352 without need for significant additional budgetary 
allocations from Congress (other than that already allocated under the Byrne 
Program).353  So liberated, members of Congress adopt whatever policies they 
desire, secure in the knowledge of the major political benefits of backing laws that 
are not only tough on despised sex offenders,354 but that also exalt the memory of 
highly sympathetic individual victims such as Jacob Wetterling, Megan Kanka, 
and Adam Walsh.355    
                                                                                                                            
348 On the role of such agents in the federal legislative process more generally, see MARK 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1995). 
349 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 729 (2005) (noting 
that “unlike most areas of regulation, criminal law features pro-regulatory forces that are strong and 
unified and face little coordinated opposition”).  
350 On this tendency more generally, see ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA’S 
POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN TOO MUCH AND GOVERN TOO LITTLE 154 tbl.3 (1997). 
351 Indeed, even individuals convicted of federal crimes will not be subject to federal 
registration, but rather will be the responsibility of the state registration systems.  See AWA Final 
Guidelines, supra note 187, at 47.   
352 The AWA provision permitting federal prosecution of interstate registration violations is an 
exception.  It is highly unlikely, however, that many federal prosecutions will be mounted.  Even if of 
mainly symbolic importance, the federal failure-to-register provision sends an important message: 
that the states cannot handle registration violations themselves and that the federal government must 
come to the rescue.  See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration: Federal Prosecution, NAT’L 
L.J., Mar. 5, 2007, at 23.    
353 See supra note 281 (discussing modest grants for implementing AWA thus far announced 
by the Department of Justice).  
354 See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary 
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 323–25 (2003) (noting strong 
political appeal of anti-sex offender laws).   
355 The AWA marks the zenith of this personalization.  Not only is the AWA named after a 
victim but it also enshrines the names of 17 other victims in its “declaration of purpose,” along with 
their brief personal descriptions and the accounts of their victimizations.  The law was enacted “to 
protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious 
attacks by violent predators against the victims . . . ” specified. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).  
Furthermore, personalization is reflected in particular parts of the AWA itself.  Seemingly wary of in 
any way besmirching the memory of prior namesakes, Congress established as a constituent part of 
the AWA “the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender Registration 
and Community Notification Program,” victims already named in the list of seventeen. 42 U.S.C. § 
16902 (2006). 
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The legislative process leading to passage of the laws has been symptomatic 
of the aforementioned impoverishment, with the evolution of the Adam Walsh Act 
AWA again serving as a telling example.  Although several years in the making, 
the AWA derived from a troubling fast-track modus operandi.  The originating 
legislation (H.R. 3132) passed on September 14, 2005, by voice vote, and six 
months later the bill was again before the House, this time minus Democrat 
sponsored amendments targeting hate crimes and a provision banning the sale of 
firearms to persons convicted of sex crimes.  Shepherded by the Republican 
leadership through the House under suspension of the rules without debate, 
apparently due to concerns over the amendments, the new bill (H.R. 4472) again 
passed by voice vote on March 8, 2006.356  The summary process, following a 
similarly truncated consideration of Megan’s Law a decade earlier,357 prompted the 
following statement from Representative John Conyers (D-MI): 
 
I rise in strong opposition to this legislation and the manner by which it 
comes before us today. [T]his legislation, all 164 pages, has managed to 
completely circumvent the traditional legislative process.  
 
Without the benefit of a single hearing or committee markup, the 
legislation has somehow found its way here to the floor of the House of 
Representatives.  To make matters worse, it’s being considered under 
suspension of the rules, leaving [members] with reasonable concerns no 
opportunity to offer modest amendments . . . . 
 
After criticizing the omission of the hate crimes and the firearms ban 
provisions, Representative Conyers spoke directly to the lack of scrutiny 
associated with the bill’s adoption of a conviction-based classification scheme: 
 
[T]he measure under consideration today includes a complex system of 
categories whereby sex offenders are classified based upon the nature of 
their offense.  They are also routinely forced to verify the accuracy of 
their registry information based upon this system.   
 
This new system of registration and registry verification has never been 
discussed by members of [the House Judiciary] [C]ommittee.  While 
some may certainly welcome such a system, others most likely will not.  
                                                                                                                            
356 Seth Stern, House Moves on Anti-Crime Package, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, Mar. 13, 2006, at 
709. 
357 See 142 CONG. REC. H11,049, H11,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt) 
(noting that the bill was not subject to House Judiciary Committee consideration). 
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In either event, a change of this magnitude should not be undertaken 
without adequate thought, consideration and debate.358  
 
Attention then shifted to the Senate, which on May 4, 2006, adopted a 
markedly different approach, including, inter alia, a provision affording states 
significant latitude in registrant classification decisions and excluding juveniles 
from registration and community notification.359  
Two months later, what came to be the AWA emerged for vote, with the 
conviction-based regime and other trappings of the original House bill (including 
the required registration of juveniles) intact.  With the only mention of the 
inscrutable process coming from Senator Kennedy (D-MA), who adverted to 
“difficult compromises” that had to be made,360 the bill passed in both the Senate 
(July 20) and House (July 25) by voice vote.    
The AWA’s passage also affords a compelling example of congressional 
disinterest in expert input.  Emblematic of this, in June 2005, a key formative 
phase of the AWA, the House Judiciary Committee received testimony from: 
 
• Representatives Foley (R-FL), Poe (R-TX), Brown-Waite (R-FL), 
and Pomeroy (D-ND);  
• Tracy Henke (Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice); 
• Laura Parsky (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice);  
• Charlie Crist (Attorney General of Florida); 
• Ernie Allen (President and CEO, National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children);  
• Amie Zyla (a child victim of sexual assault);  
• Carol Fornoff (mother of a murdered child);  
• John Rhodes (Assistant Federal Public Defender, Montana); and  
• Fred Berlin (Associate Professor, Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins  
University School of Medicine).361  
 
                                                                                                                            
358 152 CONG. REC. H677 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
359 152 CONG. REC. S4079 (daily ed. May 4, 2006).  With respect to classification, the bill 
provided that “[t]he tier designation of an individual shall be determined under criteria promulgated 
by the participating State in accordance with the participating State’s resources and local priorities.”  
Id. at S4086. 
360 152 CONG. REC. 8022 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
361 Also, the House Record for March 8, 2006, contains letters with critical analysis of various 
provisions of the House legislation from the Association for the Treatment of Sex Offenders; State of 
New Jersey, Office of the Public Defender; the American Civil Liberties Union; and Human Rights 
Watch. See 152 CONG. REC. H657, 687–691 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006).  
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Other than Dr. Berlin, no individual offered critical analysis of registration or 
community notification in general362 or the provisions of the proposed legislation 
in particular,363 and Berlin was subjected to extended political monologs and few 
substantive questions.  Witness Foley, a co-sponsor of the bill, and chair of the 
“Congressional Missing and Exploited Children’s Caucus,” who himself was later 
forced to resign due to his misbehavior with adolescent male staffers, mistakenly 
intoned that only “most states have some form of registry”364 (when of course all 
states do).   
Perhaps more important, so far as the formal record reveals, other than Florida 
Attorney General Crist, an advocate of the bill, no input was sought from or 
provided by state and local authorities, who not only would be tasked with 
implementing the new registration and community notification policies, but also 
have extensive experience with the challenges posed by registration and 
notification.  The central feature of the AWA’s regime, the conviction-based 
classification approach, closely resembles the approach of Delaware, one of the 
nation’s smallest states (home to Joseph Biden, a co-sponsor of the AWA).  Even 
more remarkable, is the decision of Congress to impose uniform registration and 
community notification requirements, despite not only the ongoing lack of 
empirical evidence of the public safety benefits of registration and notification 
more generally, but also the specific requirements mandated (e.g., conviction based 
approach, frequent in-person verification, and targeting juveniles).365     
                                                                                                                            
362 See Protecting Our Nation’s Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: What 
Needs to be Done?  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 22 (2005) (statement of Fred Berlin, M.D., Associate 
Professor, Johns Hopkins University) (noting that “the verdict is not yet in on whether [community 
notification] is proving to be successful” and expressing concern that it merely encourages registrants 
to commit crimes in communities where they are not known; identifying need for research into 
whether community notification will drive registrants “underground”; and that community 
notification might identify incest victims and perhaps discourage reporting of incest). 
363 Federal Defender Rhodes did raise significant questions over the bill’s proposed 
significantly enhanced penalties for federal sex offenses, which he condemned for having adverse 
impact on those committing crimes on Indian reservations.  See Protection Against Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act of 2005, and the Prevention and Deterrence of Crimes Against Children 
Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2318 and H.R. 2388 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 38 (2005) (statement of John 
Rhodes, Assistant Federal Defender, Montana). 
364 House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1355, 
H.R. 1505, H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) 
(statement of Rep. Foley).  A similar lack of basic familiarity was evidenced in the statement of 
Representative James Gillmor (R-VA), who offered that “[c]urrently, each state classifies offenders 
differently according to the risk they pose to the community,” when of course most states do not use 
individualized risk determinations at all. 152 Cong. Rec. H680 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of 
Rep. Gillmor).    
365 Notably, the only evidence of Congress’s willingness to consult states came after the fact, 
with its directive to the Attorney General to conduct future studies on the comparative benefits of risk 
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Finally, the above-described legislative deficiencies were in no sense 
ameliorated by the involvement of the executive branch.  While of late, 
commentators have argued in favor of the redemptive benefit of executive rule-
making, asserting, inter alia, its utility in mitigating common public choice and 
federalism deficiencies of Congress,366 the executive’s role in refining the AWA 
cannot be counted among such successes.367  As noted above, the Attorney 
General’s efforts have been marked by a steadfast insularity from state and expert 
input, delay, and disregard for federalism concerns.368   
The point of the foregoing is not to say that state legislative consideration of 
registration and community notification has always been superior.  State laws, too, 
have often been fast-tracked and devoid of expert input.369  Nor is it accurate to say 
that state registration and community notification laws are as a rule more measured 
or enlightened than those emanating from Congress.370  
Important differences do exist, however, perhaps explaining to some degree 
the quality of federal law.  In states, at least some nominal resistance has 
manifested, i.e., an actual “debate” has occurred.  Such was the case in Minnesota, 
for instance, the home of Jacob Wetterling, the location of the influential 
                                                                                                                            
and conviction-based classification methods.  The Attorney General is to assemble a task force 
consisting of persons who “represent national, State, and local interests” and possess expertise in 
relevant academic and experiential areas.  See Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 637, 120 Stat. 637 (2006). 
366 See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Admin Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008).  
367 Whether congressional delegation of authority under the AWA was itself warranted is 
subject to question.  To date, delegation-based challenges to the Attorney General’s decision on the 
retroactive application of the AWA, in particular, have failed.  See, e.g., United States v. Samuels, 
543 F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D. Ky. 2008).  However, it is arguable whether these outcomes, and the more 
general desuetude of the non-delegation doctrine itself, are justified.  Not only do the policy matters 
in question have unique normative importance affecting the liberty of individual citizens, but they 
also lack the technical complexity that typically justifies delegation based on agency expertise, not to 
mention the need for insulation from undue political influence (such as with environmental 
regulations).  Moreover, unlike the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, federal guidelines issued since Wetterling have never been subject to even nominal 
congressional oversight and approval, further undercutting political salience and accountability.  
368 See supra notes 236–263 and accompanying text.  With respect to federalism in particular, 
the process betrayed ostensible executive sensitivity to federalism, as embodied in Executive Order 
13,132 which discourages “one-size-fits-all approaches to public policy problems” and urges the 
national government to be “deferential to the States when taking action that affects the policymaking 
discretion of the States…” or when there are “uncertainties regarding constitutional or statutory 
authority of the national government.”  Exec. Order 13,132(2), 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (1999).       
369 For a detailed overview of this history see LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 7, 
ch. 3. 
370 States, for instance, have succumbed to the temptation to proliferate registration eligibility 
criteria beyond reason (e.g., posting an obscene bumper sticker in Alabama, or “Romeo and Juliet” 
encounters between teens in several states) and imposed draconian community notification regimes 
(e.g., requiring that registrants inform neighbors of their presence in the community in Louisiana). 
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Wetterling Foundation (founded by his mother Patty), and the fifteenth state to 
adopt a sex offender registration requirement (in 1991).  From the outset, the bills 
and amendments introduced by members were measured in tone and conscious of 
the practical difficulties and possible negative constitutional implications of 
registration.371  Concerns over constitutionality were publicly expressed by even 
the state’s Republican Governor, Arne Carlson.372  In ensuing years, amid several 
widely reported sexual victimizations of women and children, the state’s 
registration law grew in scope and came to be complemented by community 
notification, yet critical testimony and debate remained the political norm.373  The 
outcome has been a provision decidedly less onerous than the AWA (including the 
provision of extensive due process protections for registrants in its risk-based 
classification regime).  A similar measured course of events marked the origin and 
evolution of New York’s registration and notification regime, which also numbers 
among the nation’s most tempered.374  
Needless to say, the political culture and legislative dynamic of states vary. 
“Blue” states such as New York and Minnesota certainly cannot be said to qualify 
as national benchmarks (or bellwethers).  Nevertheless, the palpable differences in 
the evolution of some state laws highlight the distinctiveness of the federal 
legislative process relative to registration and notification.  Whether, as Dan Filler 
asserts, the federal process was significantly influenced by the presence of C-
SPAN’s national television audience, with “members of Congress seem[ing] to 
play to the cameras,”375 or is perhaps explained by other structural factors,376 is 
beside the point.  The modus operandi of Congress over the twelve year period 
(1994–2006) in which federal registration and community notification policy has 
evolved shows a decided path-dependence, consistent with what William Stuntz 
has termed its unique “pathology.”377  The trouble is, with the federal government 
as the central planner, policy resulting from this pathology is imposed on the 
nation as a whole, rather than being undertaken as an “experiment[] without risk to 
                                                                                                                            
371 See Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1292–93 
(2003). 
372 Id. at 1293. 
373 Id. at 1296–1321. 
374 See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 
76 IND. L.J. 315, 333–46 (2001).  
375 See id. at 361. 
376 In New York, for instance, the state’s legislative structure was more conducive to 
concentrated critical consideration of bills because they came before legislators on single days, unlike 
the more diffused approach of Congress which “took the form of speeches, rather than focused 
debate, allowing easy avoidance of complex issues and questions.”  Id. at 361–62. 
377 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 
(2001). 
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the rest of the country,” as Justice Brandeis suggested,378 and James Madison 
envisioned.379   
 
B. Floors, Ceilings, Uniform Laws? 
 
Presuming, however, federal determination to intervene, a final question must 
be addressed: Should the policy assume the form of a floor, prescribing only 
minimum requirements for states; a hybrid floor-ceiling approach, containing both 
minima and limits on what states can do; or a uniform set of requirements, which 
states must adopt without variation or customization?  The question has been 
considered in other contexts, such as environmental regulation,380 with the federal 
government historically inclined first to set “floors” based on worries over undue 
state proclivity for laxness,381 and more recently “ceilings,” prompted by concerns 
over states being too onerous.382  Because the federal government has customarily 
refrained from imposing criminal justice policy on the states as a whole, however, 
the issue remains an important and largely unexplored one warranting at least 
preliminary attention here. 
With floors, the federal government identifies a set of minimum requirements 
that states must adopt, yet which states can augment.  This of course has been the 
federal modus operandi with registration and notification policy since the 
Wetterling Act.  While the minima themselves are problematic from a federalism 
perspective, for reasons discussed earlier, the use of a floor enjoys some benefit.  
Presuming that the federal floor itself constitutes sound policy (a big qualifier 
here), use of a floor preserves for states some freedom to customize.  As a result, 
                                                                                                                            
378 New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
379 According to Madison, who of course wrote in a time when exercise of federal police 
power was meager, federalism was created with the potentiality of mitigating such extremism among 
states.  Rather than nullifying such laws, the governing arrangement permitted them to be cabined in 
their place of origin:  
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will 
be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States . . . .  A rage for 
paper money, for an abolition of debts . . . or for any other improper or wicked project, 
will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union . . . therefore, we behold a 
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
380 See, e.g., William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007). 
381 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining 
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 
99–104 (1996) (discussing public choice reasons for why states will enact under-protective 
environmental laws).  
382 Buzbee, supra note 380, at 1568-76 (citing recent federal concern over efforts of certain 
states to impose more stringent regulations than other states).  
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interests of state autonomy, decentralization, and possible experimentation are 
preserved to some degree.  
These benefits, however, are qualified.  With a floor, as discussed, the specter 
of a “patchwork” of state laws exists, creating the risk that residents of states with 
more stringent requirements will be comparatively better off.  Moreover, creation 
of a federal floor merely serves to facilitate the natural evolutionary accretion 
noted above, with the pathological federal regime merely augmented by that of 
individual states.  State legislators, themselves in the C-SPAN audience,383 and 
acutely aware of the political salience of toughened registration requirements, have 
quite willingly embraced the opportunity, enacting provisions with impressive 
speed.  A floor thus obliges states to “level-up” to federal standards, and in the 
current politically fertile atmosphere, affords a basis for the one-way ratchet so 
common to criminal justice to operate,384 with provisions getting tougher by the 
year, backed by overwhelming political support.385  
What then of a floor-ceiling hybrid?  On first impression, such an approach is 
hard to envisage.  Unlike ceilings in environmental regulations, now enjoying 
increasing federal favor, where there is a tangible and often specific benchmark, 
such as with pollution emission rates, registration and notification do not lend 
themselves to maximum standards.  However, the AWA does contain a discrete 
provision that can be taken as a ceiling, assuming the form of mandatory 
exclusions from public dissemination on state web site registries (e.g., registrants’ 
social security numbers).386  Although the myriad matters possibly pertaining to 
registration and community notification make ceilings difficult, they would in 
theory be possible.  Congress could, if it wished, for instance, expressly bar 
registration of juveniles altogether or adults convicted of non-physical sexual 
misconduct (e.g., indecent exposure or possession of pornography).  Such limits, 
however, would have to be mandatory not optional, and coming as they would 
from the federal policy-making environment described above, should be expected 
                                                                                                                            
383 Filler, supra note 374, at 324 n.60.  
384 Ironically, just such a concern was voiced by Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), a co-sponsor 
of the AWA, who in floor debates condemned Aimee’s Law, enacted in 2000, which allowed a state 
to recoup costs associated with the prosecution and punishment of an individual convicted of serious 
crimes when such individual was previously convicted of a similar crime in another state, and the 
latter state did not incarcerate the individual to the extent deemed appropriate by the federal 
government.  42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000).  According to Senator Biden, the law would “promote a 
‘race to the top,’ as states feel compelled to ratchet up their sentences—not necessarily because they 
view such a shift as desirable public policy—but in order to avoid losing crucial federal law 
enforcement funds.” 146 CONG. REC. 22106 (2000). 
385 Here, one sees another telling contrast between environmental and criminal justice policy.  
In the former, many states have enacted statutes that bar state regulators from imposing standards 
more stringent than the applicable federal floor.  See Jerome M. Organ, Limitation on State Agency 
Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than Federal Standards: Policy 
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1376–86 (1995). 
386 See 42 U.S.C. § 16918(b)-(c) (2006).  
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to be few in number.  Also, under current political conditions the creation of a 
federal ceiling will naturally serve to inspire states to satisfy that benchmark (e.g., 
imposing a duration cap on community notification), leading to possible sub-
optimal outcomes.  
Finally, consideration must be afforded a uniform rule.  Just as uniformity of 
results is often regarded as preferable in the federal criminal justice system, 
ensuring consistency of results nationwide,387 so too does it have advantages with 
respect to state registration and notification policy, at least in theory.388  The 
“patchwork” of laws concerning Congress would be eliminated: residents would 
receive the same protections, and the systemic inefficiencies bred by varied state 
laws, prompted especially when registrants change state residence (or live, work 
and attend school in different jurisdictions), would be avoided.  Indeed, registrants 
themselves would be deprived of any incentive they might have to migrate in 
search of a less onerous regime, leading to greater stability of the registrant sub-
population and fewer challenges for state authorities charged with updating and 
verifying registrants’ information.  
These potential benefits, however, must be balanced against the detriments of 
uniformity.  Uniformity has clear negative implications for the cluster of 
federalism interests discussed earlier.  With uniformity, as William Buzbee has 
written, there is imposed on states a “final, unitary federal choice.”389  This 
outcome becomes especially problematic when its constituent parts, the rules that 
apply to the states, are predicated on incomplete or unfounded knowledge, and 
result from an impaired process, as has been the case with registration and 
notification.   
These fundamental concerns, however, do not exhaust the pitfalls of 
uniformity.  With criminal justice, as with national environmental policy,390 efforts 
to impose uniform rules risk creation of a mere false appearance of uniformity.  
Substantive criminal laws and punishments,391 especially relative to sexual 
                                                                                                                            
387 Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in 
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65 (2006).  
388 On the perceived benefits of uniform state laws more generally, see Larry E. Ribstein & 
Bruce Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138–40 
(1996).   
389 Buzbee, supra note 380, at 1619. 
390 See James E. Krier, On the Typology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal 
System—and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1237 (1995) (noting that “the federal uniform 
environmental quality standards have failed (and probably always will fail) to achieve uniform 
environmental quality across all the states.”).  
391 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 987 (1991) (noting the “enormous 
variation” in state penalties); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755 n.14 (1984) (“the classification 
of state crimes differs widely among the States . . . .”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 
(1952) (“crimes in the United States are what the laws of the individual States make them . . . .”). 
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misconduct,392 show considerable variation among the states.  A uniform rule only 
serves to paper over this diversity.   
The AWA’s centerpiece tier-based classification system, for instance, is 
pegged to the normative punishment decisions of individual states, requiring that 
tier classifications turn on whether convictions are “punishable by imprisonment 
for more than 1 year.”393  An “individual convicted of a sex offense” that warrants 
less than one year punishment under state law receives a tier I classification.394  
Tiers II and III are reserved for state convictions punishable for more than one year 
and involve offenses substantively “comparable to or more severe than” specified 
federal offenses.395  Variations thus inevitably arise based on differences in state 
criminal laws and punishments.  The consequences of these differences are 
significant, determining where an individual is placed within tiers I through III, 
with the outcome driving (i) the duration of registration (and hence community 
notification via the Internet), with tier I warranting 15 years, tier II 25 years, and 
tier III life; (ii) the frequency of required in-person verification, with tier I 
requiring annual, tier II semi-annual, and tier III quarterly; and (iii) whether the 
registrant’s information can be exempted from public disclosure (reserved for tier 
I, under certain circumstances). 
Ultimately, the federal government should impose nationwide criminal justice 
policy with great caution, if at all.  Consistent with what David Super has called 
the “leadership model” of fiscal federalism,396 the federal role can be, as it was in 
earlier decades,397 and on occasion is still so today,398 engaged in a constructive 
experimentalist partnership with states based on incentivizing “carrots” not 
coercive “sticks.”  Part of this relationship can be the development of model laws, 
regarded as John Dewey would have it, “as working hypotheses, not as programs 
to be rigidly adhered to and executed.”399  Indeed, such an approach was suggested 
in the omnibus 1994 legislation containing the Wetterling Act, which entailed a 
provision directing the attorney general to evaluate state juvenile handgun laws to 
                                                                                                                            
392 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX 
LAWS 2, 44–46 (1996) (surveying variations and referring to the laws as a “crazy quilt”).  
393 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2)-(4) (2006).   
394 Id. § 16911(2). 
395 Id. § 16911(3)-(4). 
396 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2577 (2005).   
397 See supra notes 14–47 and accompanying text.  
398 See, e.g., Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked Up Menace: Responses to 
Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508, 2516–19 (2006) (noting that with 
respect to the effort to combat the methamphetamine problem, the United States has been deferential 
to states and provided technical and fiscal support in the nature of incentives consistent with federal 
will).  
399 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 202–03 (1927).  Cf. United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (“the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to 
devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”). 
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develop model legislation, and to disseminate the study’s findings to the states.400  
With a model law, a process can occur that is akin to the “efficient sorting” Larry 
Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi observed with civil laws drafted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).401   
 In sum, much as in decades before, when the federal government was far less 
willing to dictate criminal justice policy to the states, individual states, attracted to 
the approach advocated, can adopt and modify it as they see fit, and ideally through 
an evolutionary process, superior policy results ultimately can be achieved.  In this 
way, the federal role can be like that of the American Law Institute in the creation 
of the Model Penal Code.  The Code, as Herbert Wechsler said, was created not to 
“achieve uniformity in penal law throughout the nation,” but rather to serve as a 
model to “stimulate and facilitate the systematic re-examination of the subject.”402         
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Federal concern over the perceived national menace of crime is of course not 
new.403  What is new, however, is the federal government’s resolve to impose a 
national solution and the lack of any meaningful countervailing resistance to it.404  
Just as the U.S. has increasingly moved to nationalize and render more uniform 
heretofore disparate state approaches to commercial law, such as products liability, 
and environmental policy, it has done so with criminal justice policy—in particular 
that relating to sex offender registration and community notification.  That the shift 
                                                                                                                            
400 See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2012 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5653).  The 
AWA itself authorizes grants to states for the purposes of “establishing, enhancing, or operating” 
involuntary civil commitment regimes for “sexually dangerous persons,” when such programs are 
“consistent with guidelines issued by the Attorney General.” 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2006).  Why 
Congress adopted this approach with involuntary commitments is unclear.  However, the enormous 
cost associated with maintaining commitment regimes, which itself has served as the major 
impediment to its greater usage in states, doubtless played a role.  See Janus & Logan, supra note 
354.  While Congress has been willing to impose on the states unfunded mandates to the degree 
associated with registration and community notification, the consequences of civil commitment 
appear to exceed that level of willingness. 
401 Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 388, at 133. 
402 Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal 
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (1968). 
403 See, e.g., RICHARD M. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN 
VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 3–36 (quoting Abraham Lincoln’s concern voiced in 1837 over the 
“increasing disregard for law which pervades the country . . . .”).   
404 Symptomatic of this shift, almost fifty years before the AWA codified federal authority to 
prosecute emigrant sex offenders, Congress briefly entertained a very similar provision.  In 1960, 
Representative John A. Lafore, Jr. (R-PA) introduced a bill “[t]o provide that known sex offenders 
who travel in interstate commerce shall register as prescribed by the Attorney General.”  If an eligible 
individual did not register within seven days of “entry into any federal district,” the individual faced a 
$1,000 fine, a year in prison, or both. H.R. 11,652, 86th Cong. (1960) (introduced Apr. 7, 1960).  The 
bill died in committee while the AWA’s criminal provision won overwhelming endorsement.  
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has occurred via federal use of the “Trojan horse”405 of conditional spending power 
authority, rather than through the more controversial method of Commerce Clause 
authority, does not alter the outcome.  The nationalization of registration and 
notification, systematically achieved by the federal government over a fifteen-year 
period, has had major effect on constitutional federalism and the states themselves.  
It may be that the unique social and political dynamic inspired by sex offenders is 
unique,406 limiting the broader implications of the story chronicled here.  However, 
given the high political salience and potency of crime control more generally, and 
the disdain felt for criminal offenders, this might well not be the case.  If indeed 
the essence of federalism lies, as William Livingston asserted over fifty years ago, 
“not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in [the attitudes of] society 
itself”407 then the transformation recounted here may well have broader 
implications for other criminal justice policy areas in the years to come. 
                                                                                                                            
405 See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan 
Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85. 
406 This uniqueness is perhaps reflected in comparison to federal efforts to promote 
determinate sentencing among states with the Truth-in-Sentencing law.  See Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-
13709 (1994)).  With the TIS, enacted as part of the same omnibus 1994 law containing the 
Wetterling Act, Congress tied federal grants for prison construction to states enacting laws requiring 
that their violent offenders serve at least eighty-five percent of the sentences imposed upon them.  In 
contrast to the sustained effort mounted with registration and notification, and despite the popularity 
of a toughened stance on violent offenders, federal (and state) interest waned, and the program was 
discontinued.  See Susan Turner et al., An Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Violent Offender 
Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants, 86 PRISON J. 364 (2006).  Similarly, 
“Aimee’s Law,” a 2000 law intended by Congress to ensure longer terms for offenders by requiring 
that states in effect reimburse one another for costs associated with convicts that they prematurely 
release and recidivate in another state, was never fully implemented.  See supra note 212.  
407 William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, 67 POL. SCI. QTLY. 81, 84 
(1952).  See also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987) (federalism “is a way of 
thinking”). 
